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Free trade is not a principle, it is an expedient.
Benjamin Disraeli
I. INTRODUCTION
As demonstrated by the cases involving lumber from Canada,' cement
from Mexico, 2 and semiconductors from Japan, 3 to name only a few, the
most significant areas of trade between two countries rarely are resolved after
a single flareup of trade tensions. Rather, trade disputes involving these
goods recur periodically until trade negotiators somehow can design creative
1. Self-Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation: Certain Softwood Lumber
Products from Canada, 56 Fed. Reg. 56,055 (1991) [hereinafter Lumber Products from
Canada]; Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation: Certain Softwood Lumber Products
from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 21,205 (1986); Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation:
Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,878 (1982).
2. Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews and
Requests for Revocation in Part, 62 Fed. Reg. 50,292, 50,293 (1997); Initiation of
Antidumping Duty Investigation: Gray Portland Cement and Clinker from Mexico, 54 Fed.
Reg. 43,190 (1989).
3. Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of 256 Kilobits and Above from
Japan: Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigation, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,450 (1985); Erasable
Programmable Read Only Memories (EPROMs) from Japan: Initiation of Antidumping Duty
Investigation, 50 Fed. Reg. 43,603 (1985); 64K Dynamic Random Access Memory Com-
ponents (64K DRAMS) from Japan: Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigation, 50 Fed.
Reg. 29,458 (1985).
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ways to meet the needs of each country. In the first round of a trade "war,"
one country may have an edge, perhaps because of higher demand for its
product, or an exchange rate favorable to its exporters, or an initially
successful unfair trade action brought by its producers. When such an
asymmetrical situation prevails, the solution that emerges is likely to be
fragile, for the simple reason that the fundamental needs of the disadvantaged
country have not been met. Moreover, the first-round advantage often shifts,
causing the previously handicapped country to abandon the initial solution in
the hopes of a more favorable outcome.4
In the final analysis, the perceived needs of each country must be
conscientiously addressed before one can confidently predict the end of a
dispute. Unfortunately, the self-evident nature of these observations to the
historian rarely serves as an aid to the trade negotiator attempting, in the
tumult that accompanies the eruption of trade conflicts, to develop a
permanent solution to an undesirable interruption in an otherwise smooth
relationship with a major trading partner.
This is the situation with the importation of winter vegetables from
Mexico. Production of winter vegetables (tomatoes, bell peppers, cucumbers,
eggplant, and squash) in Florida is a US$530 million a year business.5
Mexican exports of these winter vegetables to the United States, valued at
US$727 million for 1995-96, accounted for approximately one percent of
Mexico's total annual exports to the United States.6 In anyone's book, these
are the kinds of numbers that can be expected to cause governments to take
strong positions in support of their industries, even at the risk of disturbing
the peaceful calm of a trade relationship with a vital neighbor.
For discussion purposes, we have been asked by Professor Gordon to
assume that the agreement entered into in October 1996 between the U.S.
Department of Commerce (Commerce)7 and Mexican tomato exporters,
4. For example, in 1991, responding to pressure that had been mounting inexorably for
five years from its lumber industry, Canada repudiated an agreement with the United States
that had settled the 1986 countervailing duty investigation of this US$2 billion-a-year trade
irritant. See Lumber Products from Canada, 56 Fed. Reg. at 56,056.
5. Based on January-July 1996 data as reported by the Florida Agric. Stat. Serv., State
Statistical Report: Vegetables (visited June 3, 1998) <http://www.nass.usda.gov/fl/
veg/v9596apv.htm>.
6. Based on December 1995-May 1996 data as reported in U.S.D.A., ECON. RES. SERV.,
FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES. These data are available in Lotus
spreadsheet format at <gopher://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu:70/11/reports/erssor/trade/fau-
bb/data> (visited June 9, 1998). The percentage calculation is based on total 1996 imports
from Mexico of US$73 billion as reported in the National Trade Data Base, which is based
on information from the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce.
7. The U.S. Department of Commerce is responsible for determining whether imported
merchandise is subsidized or dumped. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a), 1673, 1677(1) (1994). An
independent federal agency, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), decides whether
an industry in the United States is being materially injured or threatened with material injury
1997]
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which resulted in suspension of an antidumping investigation of tomatoes
from Mexico, has ended. The new owner of many of Florida's winter
vegetable producers, concerned with the continuing rise in market share
represented by Mexican imports, is considering further action under the trade
remedy and other laws. This article will discuss the potential role of the
antidumping and countervailing duty laws in these deliberations, as well as
the operation of the dispute settlement mechanisms of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
II. PURPOSE OF THE UNFAIR TRADE LAWS
The definitive defense of the unfair trade laws is beyond the scope of this
article, but it is fair to ask at the start, why do the unfair trade laws exist?
Why has the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA'TT) concluded for
fifty years that unfair trading practices are to be condemned if they cause
injury to a domestic industry? While various justifications have been
advanced over the years, the most straightforward and compelling reason is
that they skew investment decisions by sending false signals to the market.
Dumping, or price discrimination between national markets, causes resources
to be misallocated by acting as a disincentive to investment in the country
where the dumping is taking place (the importing country), and as an
incentive to investment in the market of the dumper. Government subsidies
that are conditioned on export, or are targeted to specific industries, rather
than being spread broadly across the economy, distort market signals about
the subsidizing country's comparative advantage. Dumping and subsidies
have a dramatic effect on investor decisions.
Thus, although dumping and subsidies may in the short term reduce
prices in the importing country, in the longer term these practices will be
harmful to the importing country's economy because investments will be
made on basis of these false signals, and not as the result of relative
production efficiencies in the exporting country, such as an abundance of raw
material inputs or the existence of special or lower-cost labor skills. The
unfairly reduced prices impede competition by preventing producers from
entering the marketplace. Freed from competitive forces, the dumping
companies can gain control of the market and raise prices. In the long run,
the consumer's interests will be harmed, not only by the increased cost of the
by these imports. Id. §§ 1671(a)(2)(A), 1673(2)(A), 1677(2). Affirmative determinations by
both agencies are necessary for Commerce to issue a countervailing or antidumping duty
order. Id. §§ 1671(a), 1673.
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 art. VI(1) [hereinafter GATTl 1947].
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goods, but in terms of high unemployment for which they pay as citizens. 9
Dumping is especially likely in countries characterized by profit
sanctuary markets, which allow companies to operate in an environment
where market entry by exporters is prevented or impeded by trade barriers.
Exporting companies can use antidumping laws as a means to compete
against these protected competitors, by causing them to pay an additional
amount for pursuing a dumping strategy. Antidumping duties thus promote
competition by preventing domestic production from being displaced by
higher-cost imports.'l
The antidumping and countervailing duty laws attempt to remedy these
unfair trading practices by imposing an additional duty on the dumped or
subsidized imports equal to the amount of the price discrimination or the
government subsidies, with the purpose of allowing producers to compete
fairly in the marketplace.
III. ANTIDUMPING LAW
A. In General
The term "dumping" is generally used to describe price discrimination in
which a producer charges a higher price in its home market than in an export
market." Article VI of GATT 1947,12 and the Agreement on Implemen-
tation of Article VI of GATT 1994 (Antidumping Agreement), 3 authorize
WTO Members to impose antidumping duties when products are dumped and
cause material injury to, threaten material injury to, or materially retard the
establishment of a domestic industry in the export market. The dumping
aspects of these international agreements .have been incorporated into U.S.
law at Subtitle B of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.' 4
9. Other justifications for the unfair trade laws have been offered. For example, the
former Chair of the President's Council of Economic Advisers suggests that they serve as "a
poor but necessary substitute for enforceable multilateral competition policies," a rough
mechanism to cushion differences among economies with different approaches to competition.
LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON, WHO's BASHING WHOM? TRADE CONFLICT IN HIGH-TECH-
NOLOGY INDUSTRIES 268 (1992).
10. James Brander & Paul Krugman, A "Reciprocal Dumping" Model of International
Trade, 15 J. INT'L ECON. 313 (1983).
11. In certain circumstances, dumping will be measured by comparing third-country prices
or a constructed value of the merchandise to the price in the export market in question.
12. GATT 1947, supra note 8, art. VI.
13. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1A [hereinafter Antidumping
Agreement], reprinted in PHILIP RAWORTH & LINDA C. REIF, THE LAW OF THE WTO 414
(Practioners DeskBook Series, 1995) [hereinafter LAW OF THE WTO].
14. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673i.
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1. Initiation
In most cases, an antidumping investigation is commenced by the filing
of a petition requesting relief on behalf of the domestic industry producing
the domestic like product.' 5  In substance, the petition must contain
evidence "reasonably available" to the petitioners to support their claims of
material injury and dumping.' 6 In other words, it should contain informa-
tion about the condition of the domestic industry, prices of the imported
products with which they are concerned, foreign (home market or third
country) prices of comparable products, and in some cases, the cost of
producing the products.'
7
Before initiating an investigation, Commerce must confirm that there is
sufficient industry support for the petition.'8 Sufficient industry support
exists when more than fifty percent of those members of the industry
expressing either support for or opposition to the petition (excluding those
with no opinion) favor the investigation, and the supporters account for no
less than twenty-five percent of total domestic production.' 9
2. ITC Preliminary Investigation
The International Trade Commission's (ITC) preliminary investigation is
a forty-five-day proceeding in which the ITC obtains and analyzes infor-
mation to determine whether there is a reasonable indication that the
domestic industry is materially injured or threatened with material injury or
that the establishment of a domestic industry has been materially retarded by
20 Tefrreason of dumped imports. The first step in the ITC's analysis is to
determine the relevant domestic industry to be examined. The statute defines
the domestic industry as the producers of the "domestic like product."'2'
"Domestic like product" is defined, in turn, as a "product which is like...
or most similar in characteristics and uses with, the [products] subject to...
investigation. ' 22 Thus, the parameters of the domestic like product define
the parameters of the domestic industry which the ITC will examine.
15. Id. § 1673a(b). The U.S. Department of Commerce also may self-initiate an
antidumping investigation. Id. § 1673a(a). The Antidumping Agreement, however, requires
that "special circumstances" exist in order to self-initiate an investigation. Antidumping
Agreement, supra note 13, art. 5.6.
16. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1); Antidumping Agreement, supra note 13, art. 5.2.
17. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a; Antidumping Agreement, supra note 13, art. 5.2.
18. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(4).
19. Id. § 1673a(c)(4)(A); Antidumping Agreement, supra note 13, art. 5.4.
20. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a).
21. Id. § 1677(4)(A).
22. Id. § 1677(10).
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The ITC examines the existence of material injury23 based on question-
naires issued to the domestic industry that seek data regarding production
levels, shipment levels, profitability, capacity utilization, employment
statistics, investment, and other indicia of the health of the domestic
industry.24  Typically, the ITC collects data for a three-year period of
investigation, and downward trends in these factors may be indicative of
injury.
If the domestic industry appears to be materially injured, the ITC must
further determine whether that injury is by reason of the allegedly dumped
imports. 25 In order to make this determination, the ITC issues question-
naires to importers, seeking information about the volume and value of
imports subject to the investigation. The ITC seeks both aggregate data and
data for a selected sample of products subject to the investigation. The ITC
compares these data to the data obtained from domestic producers in order
to analyze the price and volume effects of the imports and their impact on
the domestic producers.26
3. Commerce Investigation
The Commerce investigation involves the collection of information
needed to calculate U.S. prices and normal value for the products under
investigation. Commerce makes adjustments to these prices to put them on
a comparable, ex-factory basis and compares them to determine whether
dumping is occurring. To obtain this information, Commerce issues
questionnaires to the foreign producers of the subject merchandise (respo-
ndents), requesting detailed information on their corporate structure and
affiliations, distribution and sales processes, accounting and financial
practices, and the specifications of the products they sell that are subject to
the investigation. In addition, Commerce normally requires respondents to
report, on a transaction-specific basis, twelve months of both their home
market and their U.S. sales. These sales reports must include all relevant
expenses on a transaction-specific basis, from price, quantity, and customer
name to a complete physical description of the merchandise sold to the
movement, packing, and direct selling expenses associated with the sale.
The twelve-month period for which data are collected is referred to as the
23. Material injury and the factors used to evaluate it are described in § 771(7) of the
Tariff Act of 1930. Id. § 1677(7).
24. Id.
25. Id. §§ 1673, 1677(7)(F).
26. In investigations involving imports from two or more countries, the ITC will cumulate
the effects of the imports from all of the countries if the investigations were initiated on the
same day and the imports compete with each other and with domestic like products. Id.
§ 1677(7)(G)(i). There are exceptions. See id. § 1677(7)(G)(ii).
1997]
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period of investigation. The period of investigation typically is the four
fiscal quarters most recently completed prior to the filing of the antidumping
petition, although Commerce has discretion to vary this period in appropriate
circumstances.27 The period -of investigation precedes the filing of the
petition in order to ensure that foreign producers cannot artificially revise
their pricing after the investigation begins solely to reduce or eliminate their
actual rates of dumping.
4. Normal Value
"Normal value" is the term used to denote the comparison point for
determining whether the U.S. price is dumped.28 Normal value may be
based on home-market sales, third-country sales, or constructed value.29
The statutory preference is to base normal value on home-market sales,
provided that home-market sales have been made in sufficient quantities to
form a basis for comparison; normally at least five percent, by volume, of
sales to the United States.3° When home-market sales do not meet this
standard, the home market is not considered "viable," and the statute directs
Commerce to examine third-country sales if they form an adequate basis for
comparison.31
If there are insufficient or no sales in either the home market or in third
countries, Commerce uses constructed value as the basis for normal value.32
When normal value is based on constructed value, Commerce calculates, for
the product imported into the United States, the sum of: (1) the cost of
materials, labor, and variable and fixed overhead; (2) packing expenses for
shipment to the United States; (3) selling, general, and administrative
expenses; and (4) profit.33
There is one additional circumstance in which Commerce uses
constructed value - when home-market or third-country sales have been
made below the cost of production, within an extended period of time in
substantial quantities, and at prices which do not permit the recovery of all
costs within a reasonable period of time.34 For these purposes, Commerce
calculates the cost of production as the sum of materials, labor, and overhead
27. 19 C.F.R. § 351.204(b) (1997); see Memorandum A-201-820 (Investigation) from
Judith Wey Rudman, Import Compliance Specialist, Office of Antidumping Investigations,
ITA, Dept. of Commerce, to Barbara R. Stafford, Deputy Ass't Secretary for Investigations,
2 (June 12, 1996) [hereinafter Memorandum].
28. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 1677b(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II).
31. Id. § 1677b(a)(1).
32. Id. § 1677b(a)(4).
33. Id. § 1677b(e).
34. Id. § 1677b(b)(1).
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costs plus selling, general, and administrative expenses.35 The extended
period of time requirement is defined as normally one year and is addressed
through Commerce's practice of using a one-year period of investigation.36
If more than twenty percent of the sales of the product in question were
made below the cost of production, Commerce considers them to have been
in substantial quantities.37 Alternatively, the substantial quantities test is
met if the weighted average price of the examined sales is less than the
weighted average cost of production for such sales.38 Commerce will find
that the prices do not permit the recovery of costs and disregard the below-
cost sales in its calculation of normal value if the price, which was below
cost at the time of sale, was also below the average cost of production for the
period under consideration. 39 If there are no above-cost sales of the product
remaining, Commerce then resorts to constructed value to determine normal
value.
Depending upon the manner in which normal value is calculated, that
figure may need to be adjusted to place it on an ex-factory basis for
comparison to the U.S. price. Adjustments include substituting U.S. packing
costs for home-market packing costs, deducting movement expenses, and
deducting any taxes imposed on home-market sales that are rebated or not
collected on U.S./export sales. 4° In addition, when the comparison is made
with the U.S. price, Commerce may make other adjustments to the normal
value to account for differences in quantity, circumstances of sale (for
example, credit, warehouse, and other expenses), level of trade, and physical
differences in the merchandise being compared.4'
5. United States Price
The U.S. price that Commerce uses to determine whether dumping is
occurring may be calculated as either an "export price" or a "constructed
export price. 42 As described in Section 772(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930,
an export price calculation is appropriate when the first sale of the merchan-
dise to an unaffiliated purchaser, either in the United States or for exportation
to the United States, is made prior to the importation of the merchandise into
the United States.43 If, on the other hand, the first sale to an unaffiliated
35. Id. § 1677b(b)(3).
36. Id. § 1677b(b)(2)(B).
37. Id. § 1677b(b)(2)(C)(i).
38. Id. § 1677b(b)(2)(C)(ii).
39. Id. § 1677b(b)(2)(D).
40. Id. §§ 1677b(a)(6)(A)-(B).
41. Id. §§ 1677b(a)(6)(C), (a)(7).
42. Id. § 1677a.
43. Id. § 1677a(a).
19971
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customer occurs after importation, constructed export price often will be the
basis for calculating U.S. price.44  Constructed export price situations
typically occur in one of two situations. Most constructed export price
transactions occur when the producer or exporter has an affiliated sales agent
in the United States. Constructed export price transactions also may occur
when the U.S. sales agent is unaffiliated, such as in the case of consignment
sales, in which the U.S. sales agent is simply the consignee and does not take
title to the merchandise.
Regardless of whether the U.S. price is based on the export price or
constructed export price, the price is adjusted, if necessary, to include U.S.
packing, home-market import duties that were rebated because of exportation,
and any countervailing duties imposed to offset export subsidies.45  The
price also will be adjusted to exclude any U.S. import duties and any
movement expenses incurred in bringing the merchandise into the United
States. 46 When the U.S. price is a constructed export price, additional
adjustments will be made to exclude any commissions, direct and indirect
selling expenses, selling expenses incurred on behalf of the buyer, and further
manufacturing expenses.47 Additionally, Commerce must now allocate




Within 140 days of initiating an antidumping investigation, Commerce
must issue a preliminary determination as to "whether there is a reasonable
basis to believe or suspect" that dumping is taking place.4 9  If the
preliminary determination is affirmative, Commerce will instruct the U.S.
Customs Service to impose a bonding requirement on the subject merchan-
dise in the amount of the estimated antidumping duties to ensure payment if
duties ultimately are imposed. 50  Regardless of whether Commerce's
preliminary determination is affirmative or negative, Commerce must
complete its investigation and issue a final determination.
44. Id. § 1677a(b).
45. Id. § 1677a(c)(1).
46. Id. § 1677a(c)(2).
47. Id. §§ 1677a(d)(1)-(2).
48. Id. §§ 1677a(d)(3), (f); see CHRISTIAN MARSH & KATHLEEN HATFIELD, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, IMPORT ADMINISTRATION POLICY BULLETIN No. 97.1, CALCULATION OF
PROFIT FOR CONSTRUCTED EXPORT PRICE TRANSACTIONS 1 (1997).
49. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(1)(A). If the investigation is "extraordinarily complicated,"
Commerce may extend the deadline for the preliminary determination to 190 days after
initiation of the investigation. Id. § 1673b(c)(1)(B).
50. Id. § 1673b(d)(B).
[Vol. I11
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7. Verification
Between the preliminary and final determinations, Commerce conducts
a verification of the data submitted by each respondent.5' This verification
consists of an on-site visit by Commerce analysts, and in some cases,
accountants, to spot-check the respondent's submitted data. Respondents are
asked to provide documentation for the sales-specific data submitted and to
reconcile that data to the company's audited books and records. Verification
of sales data often lasts a full week, while a cost verification (when below-
cost sales are being investigated) often lasts a second full week.
Following verification, but prior to the final determination, both
petitioners and respondents have an opportunity to submit briefs and
participate in a public hearing.52 New factual information may not be
submitted at this time; rather, this is an opportunity for parties to make
arguments regarding Commerce's interpretation of respondents' data and its
analysis of those data.53
8. Termination or Suspension
Commerce has limited authority to "settle" an antidumping investigation
prior to completing its investigation.54 This authority is rarely used.55 In
fact, at present, Commerce has more than 400 antidumping duty orders in
place and only thirteen antidumping suspension agreements.56
Commerce's statutory authority to settle antidumping investigations is
found in Section 734 of the Tariff Act of 1930.57 Section 734(a) provides
Commerce with the authority to terminate an investigation based upon
withdrawal of the petition pursuant to an agreement limiting the volume of
imports into the United States.58 This authority was last used in the mid-
51. Id. § 1677m(i).
52. Id. § 1677m(g).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 1673c.
55. See, e.g., The Uruguay Round Trade Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative
Action § 3512(d), at 204, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 874 (1994) [hereinafter
Statement of Administrative Action] (noting that such agreements are "the exception rather
than the rule").
56. Department of Commerce statistics as of July 31, 1997. Statistical Summary of
AD/CVD Investigations Since 01/01/80 (visited June 3, 1998) <http:// www.ita.doc.gov/
importuadmin/records/stats/allstats.htm> (antidumping duty orders); International Trade
Administration, Suspension Agreements Currently in Effect (visited June 3, 1998) <http://www.
ita.doc.gov/import admin/records/stats/susp.txt> (suspension agreements).
57. 19 U.S.C. § 1673c.
58. Id. § 1673c(a).
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1980s to settle various steel investigations.5 9  The WTO Agreement on
Safeguards prohibits voluntary export restraints and other similar measures,
at least with other WTO member countries, thus making further use of this
provision problematic.'
Section 734(b) provides Commerce the authority to suspend an
investigation pursuant to an agreement with companies representing
substantially all (at least eighty-five percent) exports to the United States that
they will either cease dumping, or less frequently, cease exports to the United
States.6' In most cases, "cease dumping" agreements provide a mechanism
whereby Commerce calculates normal values, based on constructed value
principles, above which the signatories agree to sell their merchandise in the
United States. 62
Section 734(c) provides Commerce with the authority to suspend an
investigation pursuant to an agreement with companies representing
substantially all (at least eighty-five percent) exports to the United States that
will "eliminate" completely the injurious effect of their exports to the United
States.63 In addition, such an elimination of injury agreement must prevent
price suppression or undercutting of U.S. prices and eliminate at least eighty-
five percent of the dumping margin found in the investigation.64 Because
such an agreement does not completely eliminate the dumping that has been
found to be occurring, Commerce may only enter into such agreements when
there are extraordinary circumstances. 65 "Extraordinary circumstances" have
been defined as meaning that the case is complex and that suspension would
be "more beneficial" to the domestic industry than continuation of the
59. See, e.g., Termination of Antidumping Duty Investigation: Welded Carbon Steel Pipe
and Tube Products from Yugoslavia, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,036 (1986); Termination of Antidumping
Duty and Countervailing Duty Investigations: Oil Country Tubular Goods from Austria, 51
Fed. Reg. 664 (1986). The most widespread use of this authority had come in 1982 in the
termination of numerous antidumping and countervailing duty investigations of flat-rolled and
other steel products from various members of the European Economic Community. Certain
Steel Products from Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom: Termination of Countervailing Duty and
Antidumping Investigations, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,058 (1982).
60. Agreement on Safeguards, art. 1 l(1)(b), WTO Agreement, supra note 13, Annex 1A,
reprinted in LAW OF THE WTO, supra note 13, at 599.
61. 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(b). "Substantially all" is defined in the legislative history as not
less than 85% of exports to the United States. Senate Report No. 96-249 at 71; Statements
of Administrative Action (to P.L.96-39) at 401.
62. See, e.g., Color Negative Photographic Paper (CNPP) and Chemical Components
Thereof from Japan: Suspension of Investigation, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,547, 43,551 (1994); Grey
Portland Cement and Clinker from Venezuela: Suspension of Investigation, 57 Fed. Reg. 6706
(1992).
63. 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(c); see supra note 61 regarding the meaning of "substantially all."
64. Id. § 1673c(c)(1).
65. Id.
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investigation. 66
Section 734(l) provides Commerce with the authority to suspend an
investigation involving a nonmarket economy country pursuant to an
agreement with that country restricting the volume of imports into the United
States provided that the agreement prevents price suppression or undercutting,
is in the public interest, and can be effectively monitored.67 Typically, these
agreements have established limits on exports to the United States and a
minimum price below which those imports cannot be sold.68
In the case of an agreement pursuant to Section 734(b) or (c), before
entering into the agreement, Commerce must first determine that the
agreement is in the public interest and can be effectively monitored.69 If
Commerce finds that the terms of a suspension agreement are being violated,
it must terminate the agreement and resume the investigation from the point
of the preliminary determination. 70 Rarely, a domestic producer or respon-
dent will request "continuation" following the conclusion of a suspension
agreement.7" When continuation is requested, both Commerce and the ITC
proceed to their final determinations; however, assuming both determinations
are affirmative,72 no antidumping duty order is issued.73 Instead, the
proceeding continues to be suspended pursuant to the agreement, and if the
agreement is violated, Commerce immediately issues the antidumping duty
order.74
9. ITC Final Investigation and Antidumping Duty Order
The ITC's final investigation proceeds in much the same manner as its
preliminary investigation, albeit over a longer timeframe. If Commerce's
preliminary determination is affirmative, the ITC commences its final
investigation at that time, normally completing it forty-five days after
Commerce's final determination (assuming Commerce's final determination
is also affirmative).75 In the event of a negative preliminary determination
by Commerce, the ITC will not commence its final investigation unless and
66. Id. § 1673c(c)(2)(A).
67. Id. § 1673c(l).
68. See, e.g., Honey from the People's Republic of China: Suspension of Investigation,
60 Fed. Reg. 42,521, 42,523-24 (1995); Antidumping: Silicomanganese from Ukraine:
Suspension of Investigation, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,951, 60,953 (1994).
69. 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(d).
70. Id. § 1673c(i)(1).
71. Id. § 1673c(g).
72. If the final determination of either Commerce or the ITC is negative, the investigation
is terminated, and the agreement will have "no force or effect." Id. § 1673c(f)(3)(A).
73. Id. § 1673c(f)(3)(B).
74. Id. § 1673c(i)(1)(C).
75. Id. § 1673d(b)(2)(B).
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until there is an affirmative final determination by Commerce.
As in the preliminary investigation, the ITC issues questionnaires to the
domestic industry, importers, and foreign producers in order to evaluate the
condition of the domestic industry and the conditions of competition between
the domestic industry and the imported subject merchandise. In addition,
Commerce also may issue questionnaires to domestic consumers of the
imported product and the domestic like product in order to gain additional
perspective on the conditions of competition between these products.
If Commerce and the ITC issue affirmative final determinations, then
Commerce must publish an antidumping duty order in the Federal
Register.76 The antidumping duty order directs the U.S. Customs Service
to require U.S. importers to make cash deposits of estimated antidumping
duties." The importer may no longer post bonds in lieu of cash deposits
following publication of the antidumping duty order.8
10. Judicial/Panel Review
A party that participates in the Commerce or ITC investigation may
challenge the factual findings or legal conclusions in the final determinations
before the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT).79 In such a challenge,
the court reviews the administrative determination to determine whether it
was based on "substantial evidence on the record" (for factual findings) and
is otherwise "in accordance with law" (for legal conclusions). 80 If a party
to the litigation is dissatisfied with the decision of the CIT, that party may
appeal the adverse decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.8'
In addition to the domestic courts of the United States, two international
dispute resolution procedures are available. First, if the antidumping case
involves a member country of the WTO, that member country may invoke
the WTO's dispute settlement procedures to examine whether the action was
consistent with the WTO obligations of the United States.82 Further, for
antidumping cases involving Mexico or Canada, the affected party may
utilize the procedures established by NAFTA and challenge the final
determinations before a binational panel. 3
76. Id. § 1673e.
77. Id. § 1673e(a)(3).
78. Id.
79. Id. § 1516a(a).
80. Id. § 1516a(b).
81. Id. § 1337(c).
82. See infra part VI for further discussion of WTO dispute settlement procedures.
83. See infra part V for further discussion of NAFTA dispute settlement procedures.
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B. The 1980 Winter Vegetables Case
The dispute with Mexico over its sales of winter vegetables in the United
States traces its roots back at least to 1978. In September of that year,
several groups representing Florida growers of fresh cucumbers, eggplant,
peppers, squash, and tomatoes filed an antidumping petition against imports
of those products from Mexico. 84 Significantly, that case was limited to
"vegetables shipped during the winter vegetable season and cover[ed] entries
during the period November 1 in any year through the last day of the
following April. ' 85
The investigation was limited both in terms of the specific vegetables
covered and as to the time period during which they were shipped and
entered into the United States. There is, however, no discussion of these
limitations in Commerce's determination. The 1980 case is of limited value
in explaining temporal limitations in the scope of an antidumping inves-
tigation.
The 1980 case is, however, telling in other respects. First, the case
stands as an early example of Commerce's use of third-country sales as the
basis of fair value. Commerce found that home-market sales of the types of
vegetables under investigation were not made in sufficient quantities to
provide a basis for fair value comparisons.86 The parties agreed, and
Commerce determined that the Canadian market was essentially the same as
the U.S. market. Consequently, Commerce used sales to Canada to calculate
fair value.87 This decision was affirmed by the CIT, which agreed that the
legislative history and regulations indicate a preference for using third-
country sales as the basis for fair value over constructed value when home-
market sales are inadequate.88
In finding that the U.S. and Canadian markets were essentially the same
for winter vegetables, Commerce also determined that the markets were
"unitary."8 9  In fact, it found that sales both to the United States and to
Canada were made at the same location (Nogales, Arizona) and by the same
distributors.9 Based on its analysis of the pricing patterns within a day and
84. Certain Fresh Winter Vegetables from Mexico: Termination of Antidumping
Investigation, 44 Fed. Reg. 43,567 (1979).
85. Certain Fresh Winter Vegetables from Mexico: Antidumping: Final Determination of
Sales at Not Less Than Fair Value, 45 Fed. Reg. 20,512, 20,513 (1980) [hereinafter Winter
Vegetables].
86. Id. at 20,514.
87. Id.
88. Southwest Florida Winter Vegetable Growers Ass'n v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 10,
14-15 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
89. Winter Vegetables, 45 Fed. Reg. at 20,514.
90. Id.
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over a season, along with the recognition of the impact of quality, color
(ripeness), and the time of day of sale, Commerce determined that there was
no evidence of price discrimination between the two markets. 91  This
analysis was done on a somewhat aggregate basis because the facts presented
to Commerce did not permit it to isolate identical merchandise of identical
quality sold under identical conditions.
The 1980 Winter Vegetables case remains important to this day with
respect to its application of the below-cost sales test to perishable agricultural
commodities. It was in this case that Commerce first determined that "a
relatively high level of sales below cost is normal and to be expected" when
dealing with a perishable agricultural product.92 In fact, it found that it was
not uncommon for as much as fifty percent of a producer's sales to be below
cost over a season.93 Because this was found to constitute normal business
practice in the fresh vegetable industry, Commerce did not disregard sales to
Canada as being below cost unless the below-cost sales constituted more than
fifty percent -of that grower's total sales of that type of vegetable for the
season.94 The reliance on normal business practices and the recognition that
vegetable growers make their profit over a season rather than on individual
sales led the CIT to affirm the Department's use of a fifty-percent standard
for below-cost sales when dealing with perishable agricultural products.95
C. The 1996 Tomatoes Investigation
Following the negative determination in 1980, dumping claims against
Mexico by the Florida industry lay dormant for sixteen years. On March 29,
1995,96 the Florida tomato industry sought relief from increasing imports of
fresh winter tomatoes from Mexico under Section 201 of the Trade Act of
1974, which permits the President to impose restrictions on imports to
provide time for a domestic industry to adjust to import competition.97 This
claim was limited to tomatoes imported during the months of January
through April. 98 In April 1995, the ITC rejected Florida's claim for
provisional relief, finding, among other things, that the like product could not
properly be limited to winter tomatoes, and that the provisional relief, even
if granted, could not have had a significant impact on that season (that is,
that the injury could be timely prevented through an ordinary Section 202
91. Id.
92. Id. at 20,515.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Winter Vegetable Growers, 584 F. Supp. at 17-18.
96. Fresh Winter Tomatoes, USITC Pub. 2881, Inv. No. TA-201-64, at 1-4 (Apr. 1995).
97. 19 U.S.C. § 2251.
98. Fresh Winter Tomatoes, USITC Pub. 2881, at 1-8.
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investigation)." The Florida industry subsequently withdrew its request for
full relief under Section 202."°
A year later, the domestic industry returned with a two-pronged
approach. On March 11, 1996, they filed a petition with the ITC again
seeking full relief under Section 202 of the Trade Act of 1974.10' This
time, however, the petition virtually abandoned its claim that the like product
should be limited to winter production.10 2 In addition, the request for relief
was filed on behalf of the bell pepper industry as well as the tomato
industry. 0 3 Once again, however, on July 2, 1996, the ITC found that the
domestic tomato and bell pepper producers were not suffering "serious
injury" by substantially increased imports of tomatoes and bell peppers."
On April 1, 1996, the domestic industry filed an antidumping petition
with Commerce and the ITC. 10 5 This petition contained sufficient infor-
mation regarding the condition of the U.S. tomato growers and the prices of
Mexican tomatoes in the United States and in Mexico to justify Commerce's
initiation of an antidumping investigation."°  The petition contained
production information for the entire U.S. industry (based on USDA
statistics), including the production of the petitioners and others supporting
the petition. °7 These data established that the petitioners and the support-
ers represented more than fifty percent of U.S. fresh tomato production, thus
establishing sufficient industry support to meet the statutory require-
ments.'08
Prior to issuing its questionnaire, Commerce received comments on the
appropriate period of investigation, that is, the period for which sales would
be examined. Based on its analysis of these comments, Commerce set the
period of investigation as March 1, 1995 through February 29, 1996."°
March 1996 was not included in the period of investigation because the
99. Id. at 1-8, 1-21.
100. Fresh Winter Tomatoes, 60 Fed. Reg. 25,248 (1995).
101. Fresh Tomatoes and Bell Peppers, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,875 (1996).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Fresh Tomatoes and Bell Peppers, USITC Pub. 2985, Inv. No.TA-201-66, at 1-5 (Aug.
1996).
105. Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigation: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico, 61 Fed.
Reg. 18,377 (1996). Although the petition was filed with the Department of Commerce on
March 29, 1996, it was not considered officially filed until April 1, 1996, because it was not
timely filed with the ITC until that day. Id. The Tariff Act of 1930 requires that petitions
be simultaneously filed at both agencies. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b)(2).
106. Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico, 61 Fed. Reg. at 18,577.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Notice of Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and
Postponement of Final Determination: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,608,
56,610 (1996) [hereinafter Postponement: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico].
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petition was actually filed with Commerce in March 1996, and Commerce
noted that prefiling publicity and the commencement of the ITC's Section
201 investigation in March made the representativeness of March 1996 data
questionable." ° Commerce did not further adjust the period of inves-
tigation back to the end of the prior fiscal quarter (December 1995) because
it had no evidence that fiscal quarters were relevant in the fresh tomato in-
dustry."l
1. Respondent Selection
With the initiation of the investigation, Commerce was soon faced with
determining the appropriate Mexican growers from whom to request
information. Section 777A(c)(1) of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides that
Commerce is to "calculate individual dumping margins for all known
producers and exporters of subject merchandise."' 2 When there is a large
number of producers and exporters, however, Commerce may investigate less
than all of them and base the investigation on either a statistically valid
sample, or on examination of producers and exporters that account for the
largest volume of exports that can reasonably be examined. 1 3 Commerce,
recognizing that there were over 200 Mexican tomato growers, and possibly
as many as 600, requested comments on possible sampling or other reduced
reporting methodologies early in the investigation."'
In the 1980 investigation, Commerce had analyzed data from thirty-four
growers accounting for approximately fifteen percent of the shipments to the
United States." 5 The thirty-four growers included not only the largest
Mexican producers, but also middle- and small-sized growers." 6  Ad-
ditionally, Commerce did not examine all of the sales of the thirty-four
growers." 7 Instead, it examined a statistically representative sample of all
their transactions.1
8
Based on the comments of the Mexican government, the petitioners, and
the respondents in the 1996 investigation, Commerce decided to examine
producers and exporters accounting for the largest volumes of exports. 19
After considering the administrative resources available and its expectations
as to the number of affiliated companies that would be involved, Commerce
110. Id.
111. See Memorandum, supra note 27, at 2.
112. Postponement: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico, 61 Fed Reg. at 56,608.
113. Id.
114. Id.




119. Postponement: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico, 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,608.
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decided that it could analyze six respondents.12° Commerce found that
based on its available information, examining the top six exporters would
account for just under forty percent of exports and would include growers in
both Sinaloa and Baja.121 Commerce also stated that it would consider
information supplied by a voluntary respondent only if a selected respondent
refused to participate in the investigation.'22
2. Home Market Viability
As discussed earlier, during the 1980 investigation, Commerce found that
Mexican growers did not have sufficient home market sales to form a basis
for comparison to the U.S. sales. By contrast, in the 1996 investigation,
Commerce found that except for one respondent, home-market sales exceeded
five percent of U.S. sales and therefore, were made in sufficient quantities to
provide a basis for comparison. 12
3
The finding of home market viability in the 1996 investigation is a
significant change from the 1980 investigation. In 1980, because the home
market was not viable, Commerce based normal value (then foreign market
value) on third country sales. Specifically, Commerce based normal value
on sales to Canada that were made by the growers' consignment agents in the
United States. 124  Of course, these were the same consignment agents
responsible for U.S. sales, and it is for this reason perhaps not surprising that
Commerce found no price discrimination between U.S. and Canadian
sales. 125
In 1996, by contrast, the home market for Mexican tomatoes was found
to be viable. 126 Consequently, Commerce used home-market sales by the
Mexican growers as the basis for normal value.'2 7 These home-market
prices, set either by the grower or by a home-market consignment agent,
were compared with U.S. prices established by U.S. consignment agents. 28
Even with all of the adjustments made to set each price on an ex-factory
basis, it is reasonable to assume that this use of home-market prices increased
the possibility that margins of dumping would be found.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 56,609.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 56,613. Eco Cultivos, S.A. de C.V. (Eco) was the only exception. Eco had
neither a "viable" home market nor any third-country sales, therefore, Commerce based Eco's
normal value on constructed value. Id.
124. Winter Vegetables, 45 Fed. Reg. at 20,514.
125. Id. at 20,515-16.
126. Postponement: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico, 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,613.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 56,614.
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3. Cost Test
Perhaps the most significant differences between the 1980 and 1996
investigations relate to differences in the application of the sales-below-cost
provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930. The 1980 investigation was limited to
winter vegetables, and therefore, Commerce reasonably limited its review to
sales and costs of one winter season.129 The 1996 investigation covered all
tomatoes, regardless of their growing season, and thus raised distinct issues
relating to the period of investigation and the range of sales examined by
Commerce.'30
Commerce's use of a twelve-month period of investigation in the 1996
investigation was due, in part, to a statutory change with respect to the cost
test. The statute now provides that:
If the administering authority determines that sales made at less than
the cost of production -
(A) have been made within an extended period of time in
substantial quantities, and
(B) were not at prices which permit recovery of all costs within
a reasonable period of time,
such sales may be disregarded in the determination of normal
value. 13
The statute defines an "extended period of time" as "a period that is normally
1 year, but not less than 6 months."'132 Consequently, in order to meet the
definition of an extended period of time, Commerce normally examines home
market sales over a period of at least one year.133
The one-year period of investigation selected by Commerce, March 1,
1995 through February 29, 1996, coincided with the growing season for some
Mexican growers, but not for others. The growing season in Baja, California,
is spring through fall; therefore, growers in that region had a complete
growing season within the period of investigation. 3 4 On the other hand,
Sinaloa's growing season is fall through spring. 35  Consequently, the
period of investigation covered the last part of the 1994-95 growing season
129. Winter Vegetables, 45 Fed. Reg. at 20,513.
130. Postponement: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico, 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,609.
131. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b)(1).
132. Id. § 1677b(b)(2)(B). Comparable language is found in the WTO Antidumping
Agreement. See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 13, art. 2.2.1, n.4.
133. Postponement: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico, 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,610.
134. Memorandum, supra note 27, at 1.
135. Id.
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and the first part of the 1995-96 growing season.
Commerce recognized that there could be significant cost variations from
one season to the next due to variations in such things as weather conditions,
soil conditions, crop pests, diseases, and yields. For this reason, when the
period of investigation included sales from more than one growing season for
a region, Commerce examined the costs associated with each season
separately.
136
Commerce also recognized that costs relating to the production of a
tomato may be incurred throughout the growing season. For example,
growers will incur seed and planting costs at the beginning of the growing
season, irrigation and picking costs throughout the growing season, and field
cleanup costs at the end of the growing season. Consequently, in order to
calculate the average cost of production for the tomatoes grown during a
particular growing season, it was necessary to collect all production costs
(and yields) relating to that growing season. 137
In addition to these agriculture-specific issues, Commerce found that
Mexico experienced significant inflation during the period of inves-
tigation.'38 In order to ensure that inflation did not distort Commerce's
cost and dumping calculations, Commerce indexed each month's costs
forward to the end of the growing season, based on the consumer price index,
in order to calculate the weighted average cost for that growing season. 139
The statute contains a special rule for determining whether below-cost
sales have been made in substantial quantities, which applies with particular
force in the case of a perishable agricultural product. 40 In fact, this special
test is based on Commerce's prior practice for these products. The
antidumping law provides that below-cost sales have been made in substantial
quantities if "the weighted average per unit price of the sales under
consideration for the determination of normal value is less than the weighted
average per unit cost of production for such sales."'
14 1
Again, Commerce recognized that the application of the below-cost test
could only make sense on a growing season-specific basis. In other words,
Commerce sought to determine whether, for each growing season, the
weighted average unit price was greater than the weighted average cost."42
In order to calculate the weighted average growing season price,
Commerce determined that it was appropriate to collect all home-market sales




140. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b)(2)(C)(ii).
141. Id.; see Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 55, at 162, reprinted in H.R.
Doc. No. 103-316, supra note 55, at 832.
142. Postponement: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico, 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,613.
19971
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
for each growing season (regardless of whether they were outside the period
of investigation). 43 Commerce recognized that tomato prices may fluctuate
significantly over the course of a growing season; thus, using all home-
market sales to calculate the weighted average home-market price was more
appropriate than limiting the weighted average price to home-market
transactions during the period of investigation.'" These prices were
indexed to the end of the growing season in the same manner as were the
costs in order to allow the comparisons to be made on a common basis.1
45
If, as a result of the comparisons of costs and prices, Commerce
determined that the weighted average price exceeded the weighted average
cost, Commerce concluded that below-cost sales were not made in substantial
quantities during that growing season and no below-cost sales were excluded
from the dumping calculation. 46 If, on the other hand, Commerce deter-
mined that the weighted average cost exceeded the weighted average price,
Commerce determined that below-cost sales were made in substantial
quantities, and it became necessary to identify the below-cost sales.'47 This
identification of individual sales below cost was performed by comparing sale
prices, on a transaction-specific basis, to the weighted average cost of
production, indexed to the month in which the sale occurred.
48
The final step in determining whether a particular below-cost sale was to
be excluded from the normal value calculation was to determine whether
each individual below-cost sale was at a price sufficient to recover costs
within a reasonable period of time. 149 Commerce determined that given the
nature of the subject merchandise as a perishable agricultural product, the
appropriate period for the cost recovery test was a growing season. 5 ° For
this reason, Commerce performed the cost recovery test by comparing
transaction-specific prices with the growing season average cost. 151
As a result of this cost analysis, Commerce found that below-cost sales
were made within an extended period of time in substantial quantities and at
prices which did not permit the recovery of all costs during some growing
seasons and for some tomato types. 52 When this was the case, Commerce






148. Id. at 56,613-14.
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no above-cost sales remaining for a particular tomato type and growing
season, Commerce calculated normal value based on constructed value.
154
4. Preliminary Determination
Commerce issued its preliminary determination on November 1,
1996.155 In contrast to the 1980 investigation, in which no margins of
dumping were found, Commerce found that there was a reasonable indication
that dumping was occurring in the 1996 investigation and estimated that the
margins ranged from 4.16% to 188.45%, with the weighted average estimated
margin at 17.56%.156
5. Suspension of Investigation
Commerce, however, did not complete the 1996 investigation. Instead,
shortly after making its preliminary determination, it signed a suspension
agreement with Mexican tomato growers, who accounted for substantially all
imports of fresh tomatoes from Mexico into the United States. 157 In this
agreement, each signatory agreed to revise its prices to eliminate completely
the injurious effects of its tomato exports to the United States. 158
Consistent with the requirements of Section 734(c) of the Tariff Act of
1930,159 the agreement established a reference price below which the
signatories agreed not to sell tomatoes in the United States.' 6°  The
agreement also provided that no entry by any exporter would be dumped at
greater than fifteen percent of the estimated dumping margin for that exporter
from the investigation.161 Commerce found that the combination of these
requirements would completely eliminate the injurious effect of Mexican
tomato imports and prevent the suppression or undercutting of domestic price
levels by Mexican tomato imports.
162
For the Mexican growers, the signing of the suspension agreement
eliminated (at least for the time being) a major source of uncertainty in the
market: the existence and extent of antidumping duties. The agreement
replaced that uncertainty with a need to change how they did business. The
reference price requirements of the agreement meant that Mexican growers
154. Id.
155. Id. at 56,608.
156. Id. at 56,615.
157. Suspension of Antidumping Investigation: Fresh Tomatoes From Mexico, 61 Fed. Reg.
56,618 (1996) [hereinafter Suspension: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico].
158. Id. at 56,619.
159. 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(c).
160. Suspension: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico, 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,619.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 56,618.
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could no longer simply ship their product to the United States, accept
whatever price the consignment agent received, and hope to come out ahead
at the end of a growing season. Instead, their consignment contracts had to
be revised to ensure that consignees could not sell tomatoes on behalf of the
signatories for less than the agreed reference price. Equally important, the
consignees had to ensure that their sales contracts, on behalf of the
signatories, contained appropriate language such that the buyer could not
make claims for post-sale price adjustments, which would have the effect of
lowering the price below the reference price.1 63
D. 1997 Winter Vegetables Investigation
At this point, attention turns to the hypothetical situation posited in the
Fifth Annual International Business Law Symposium Proceedings, 164
involving a possible 1997 antidumping action against winter vegetables from
Mexico. The first issue to be wrestled with is "the transition." The
hypothetical assumes the end of the suspension agreement, but explains that
there had been general compliance with the terms of the agreement. This
suggests that the 1996 suspension agreement was not terminated pursuant to
the violation provisions of the agreement or Section 734(i) of the Tariff Act
of 1930.165 Had this been the case, termination of the agreement would
have been cause for Commerce and the ITC to resume their 1996 inves-
tigations as of the preliminary determinations and complete those inves-
tigations "without regard to the effect of' the terminated agreement. 66
This completion of the 1996 investigations would be inconsistent with the
hypothetical's instructions to consider a new antidumping case, which in any
event would be required to address the winter vegetables other than tomatoes
that also are of concern to Florida growers in the hypothetical. For these
reasons, the hypothetical would appear to assume that the 1996 petition was
withdrawn, allowing Commerce to terminate the suspension agreement and
underlying investigation. Beyond these transition issues, the hypothetical
raises several issues which relate to the ability of CONVEG to seek relief
under the antidumping provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930. We will discuss
each of these issues in turn.
163. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Clarification of Suspension Agreement on Fresh
Tomatoes from Mexico, May 2, 1997 (on file with The Florida Journal of International Law)(detailing Commerce's interpretation of the agreement and its application to claims for
spoilage). This clarification was necessary particularly to the extent that the requirements of
the agreement differ from the customary basis for making such claims pursuant to the
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 499a-499t (1994).
164. Proceedings Fifth Annual International Business Law Symposium, 11 FLA. J. INT'L
L. 233 (1997).
165. 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(i).




The antidumping law requires that Commerce find that a petition has
been filed on behalf of the domestic industry producing the domestic like
product.' 67  As previously discussed, to meet this test, more than fifty
percent of those members of the industry expressing either support for or
opposition to the petition must favor the investigation, and the supporters
must account for no less than twenty-five percent of total domestic
production. 168
The hypothetical posits the following facts relevant to the issue of
industry support: CONVEG owns approximately one-half of the South
Florida tomato and other winter vegetable farms; and CONVEG is working
with an unknown number of other Florida growers to consider filing an
antidumping petition. The hypothetical does not specify whether CONVEG
and the other growers produce tomatoes and other winter vegetables only in
Florida and whether they produce these products only during the winter
months.
The production figures for CONVEG and the other Florida growers
behind the petition, at least initially, will constitute the numerator for the
determination of industry support. The key factor in this equation will be the
denominator, the figure that represents the total production of the domestic
like product.
Commerce's calculation of the denominator will depend upon its
determination of the domestic like product.' 69 The Tariff Act of 1930
defines "domestic like product" as "a product which is like, or in the absence
of like, most similar in characteristics and uses with, the article subject to an
investigation."'70  The hypothetical facts suggest two possible domestic
industry, like product17' arguments: (1) the like products are comprised of
all production of vegetables regardless of when they are grown, or (2) the
167. Id. § 1673a(c)(4).
168. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 19.
169. While Commerce applies the same statutory definition of domestic like product as the
ITC, the two agencies apply this definition for different reasons and pursuant to different
statutory authority. Moreover, each agency maintains a distinct administrative record, possibly
containing different facts due, in part, to the different amounts of time each agency has to
develop its record. Consequently, the two agencies may arrive at different domestic like
product definitions, neither of which will be contrary to law. See, e.g., Initiation of
Antidumping Duty Investigations: Collated Roofing Nails from the People's Republic of
China, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, 61 Fed. Reg. 67,306, 67,306-07 (1996); Initiation
of Antidumping Duty Investigation: Vector Supercomputers from Japan, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,527,
43,528 (1996).
170. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10).
171. Because the domestic industry is defined in terms of producers of the domestic like
product, the two issues are closely related.
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like products are comprised only of the winter production of these vegetables.
The first approach is, on the one hand, straightforward. On the other hand,
it will have the effect of diluting the significance of CONVEG's production
figures. This dilution will be evident not only before Commerce in its
industry support determination, but also before the ITC as it examines
whether the domestic industry is materially injured by reason of unfairly
priced imports. If, for example, summer producers are better off than
CONVEG, it may be more difficult for the ITC to find material injury when
looking at the industry as a whole.
The alternative would be for petitioners to argue that the like product
should be limited to winter production of tomatoes and the other products in
question. Such a limitation would maximize the significance of the
petitioners' figures, both to establish industry support and to support a
finding of material injury. This approach would allow CONVEG and the
other supporting companies to represent a much larger share of the domestic
industry. If accepted by the ITC, it would also require the ITC's injury test
to be limited to the domestic companies growing the subject merchandise
during the winter months, thus focusing the inquiry on the "who and when"
most concerned and affected by the competition from Mexico. Attempting
to limit the like product to winter vegetables would be controversial. While
in the past, Commerce has been willing to define the like product on a
temporal basis as well as a physical basis, 172 recent experience demon-
strates that the ITC is less likely to accept these distinctions. 173
2. Timing of Filing and Period of Investigation
The timing of a petition is always an important issue for the domestic
industry. 174 The date the petition is filed represents not only the beginning
172. As noted, the 1980 Winter Vegetables case was limited to imports from Mexico during
the months of November through April. The ITC did not address this temporal requirement
because the law, at that time, did not provide for a preliminary determination of injury, and
Commerce's negative determination of dumping made unnecessary a final determination of
injury. Commerce included temporal limitations in its investigation of Fall-Harvested Round
White Potatoes from Canada, and the ITC also limited its like product definition to fall-
harvested round white potatoes. In doing so, however, the ITC appeared to recognize
physical, marketing, and price differences between fall-harvested round white potatoes and
round white potatoes harvested at other times. Fall-Harvested Round White Potatoes from
Canada, USITC Pub. 1463, Inv. No. 731-TA-124 (Dec. 1983).
173. The Florida tomato industry attempted to seek relief as to winter tomatoes under
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 in the spring of 1995. Fresh Winter Tomatoes, USITC
Pub. 2881, at 1-4. The ITC rejected the industry's claim that the like product should be
limited to winter tomatoes, finding, among other things, that there was a continuum of
production throughout the year. Id. at 1-8.
174. Many of the concerns raised here are specific to tomatoes and do not necessarily
impact CONVEG's case vis-A-vis other winter vegetables; however, to the extent that tomatoes
344 [Vol. I11
TRADE LAWS AND TOMATOES
of the calendar for the investigation, it also represents, typically, the end of
the period that will be examined to determine if relief is warranted.
The hypothetical contains one relevant piece of information to consider
from a timing perspective. The Mexican growers sold their tomatoes above
the suspension agreement reference price during the 1996-97 season. This
fact alone suggests that patience may be called for with respect to the
consideration of a new antidumping case.
Commerce's normal practice has been to establish a twelve-month period
of investigation, based on the four most recently completed fiscal quarters
prior to the filing of the petition. Commerce, however, may vary this
practice and has done so in cases involving very large or infrequently sold
products and in cases involving unusual prefiling notice of the impending
investigation and where such notice may have had an impact on the market.
Neither of these situations would appear relevant to determining whether the
1996-97 season would be included in the period of investigation of a new
antidumping investigation.
Plainly, the unique fact about the 1996-97 season is that a suspension
agreement would have been in effect with respect to tomatoes. It is unclear,
however, that this single fact would be sufficient to cause Commerce, or the
ITC for that matter, to exclude this period from the period of investigation
of a new, distinct investigation. This new investigation would differ in
scope, and because it would be a distinct investigation (rather than the
continuation of the suspended investigation begun in 1996), there is no
statutory directive to disregard the period in which the suspension agreement
operated. 17
5
If CONVEG were to pursue an antidumping action in late 1997, they
would have to assume that the 1996-97 growing season would be included
in the periods of investigation of both Commerce and the ITC. Based on the
hypothetical's statement that there was compliance with the agreement, the
Mexican growers would start from the position that during this season, (1)
they had revised their prices so as to completely eliminate any injurious
effects on the U.S. tomato industry, and (2) their price revisions eliminated
at least eighty-five percent of the previously estimated antidumping duty
margin. On the injury side, the implication would be that imports from
Mexican signatories (more than eighty-five percent of all imports from
represent the majority of winter vegetables from Mexico and the majority of winter vegetables
produced by CONVEG, the other winter vegetables may not justify the expense of further
trade litigation if relief on tomatoes is found to be unlikely.
175. As discussed supra part III.D., if the 1996 suspension agreement had been terminated
as a result of a violation, Section 7340) of the Tariff Act of 1930 instructs Commerce and the
ITC not to take the terminated agreement into account when making their final determinations
in the resumed investigation. 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(j). The hypothetical situation posits a new
investigation, and therefore, the limits of Section 7340) would not be applicable.
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Mexico), were not a cause of any further injury to the U.S. industry, making
a material injury finding by the ITC a significant challenge. Likewise at
Commerce, the implication of compliance with the agreement would be that
for most Mexican growers, the margin on any particular transaction would
be no more than 2.6%.176 This suggests a reasonable likelihood that the
weighted average margin for all transactions will be less than 2%, the
statutory threshold for de minimis margins in an investigation.
77
3. Rate Calculation Issues
When examining whether winter vegetables from Mexico are being
dumped in the United States, Commerce would most likely split the products
into separate "classes or kinds" of merchandise (for example, tomatoes, bell
peppers, cucumbers). Commerce's class or kind distinctions are based on the
physical characteristics of the products, the expectations of the ultimate
purchasers, the ultimate use of the products, the channels of trade, and the
manner of advertising and display.'78 These criteria suggest that separate
classes or kinds of merchandise for each type of winter vegetable would be
appropriate.
The significance of establishing separate classes or kinds of merchandise
based on vegetable type is that each aspect of Commerce's examination
would be separate: home market viability, examination of sales below cost,
and calculation of the dumping margin would be performed separately for
each class or kind of merchandise. Thus, while the investigation of tomatoes
might proceed in a manner comparable to the 1996 investigation, the
investigation of cucumbers might be more comparable to the 1980 inves-
tigation: (1) if there are insufficient home-market sales to use for com-
parison, Commerce would use sales to a third country (possibly Canada) as
the basis for normal value; (2) below-cost sales would have to be alleged and
investigated separately; (3) if sales to Canada were to be the basis for
comparison and such sales continue to be made in Nogales by the same
consignment agents that make U.S. sales, the likelihood of finding significant
margins of dumping may be low; and (4) such margins, if less than two
percent, would be considered de minimis and result in a negative deter-
mination by Commerce with respect to that vegetable.
For all of these reasons, significant market research would be necessary
176. The weighted average rate assigned to "All Others" in the investigation (except the
companies individually examined) was 17.56%. Postponement: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico,
61 Fed. Reg. at 56,615. Fifteen percent of that figure is 2.6%.
177. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(3). De minimis margins are treated as zero margins.
178. Diversified Prod. v. United States, 572 F. Supp. 883, 889 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983);
Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Cased Pencils from
the People's Republic of China, 59 Fed. Reg. 55,625 (1994).
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before any new antidumping case could be filed based on the hypothetical
situation. Moreover, to the extent that tomatoes represent the most
economically significant winter vegetable, CONVEG might do well to
exercise patience until a more favorable period of investigation were likely.
IV. COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW
A. In General
Subsidies materialize in many different forms. Prior to the conclusion
of the GATT Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations (Uruguay Round), the
GATT 1947 Subsidies Code did not specifically define "subsidy," even
though that is the Code's most important term, and the countervailing duty
law in the United States did so only in very general terms, which were
interpreted broadly. The new GAT[ 1994 Subsidies Agreement, by contrast,
precisely defines a subsidy as certain financial contributions provided directly
or indirectly by a government that confer a benefit. 179 This "financial
contribution" definition is narrower than the one previously applied by the
United States, although it is likely that nearly all subsidies found in past U.S.
investigations would fall within the new GATI definition.
Not all government benefits are countervailable subsidies. Pervasive
government expenditures, such as those for national defense, education,
public health, and general infrastructure are not considered countervailable
subsidies, even though they manifestly provide benefits to their recipients.
Only benefits provided by governments to a specific enterprise, industry, or
group of industries are countervailable subsidies. 80  Specific subsidies
often enable their recipients to gain an unfair advantage over other domestic
producers or over foreign manufacturers. 18' General subsidies, on the other
hand, typically do not confer such an advantage, and in fact may be
necessary because of the inability of the price system to distribute certain
essential goods and services to all members of the society.
182
B. The Uruguay Round Framework
In the Uruguay Round, negotiators relegated the types of subsidies
covered by the new Agreement into three classes, which are popularly labeled
179. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 1.1, WTO
Agreement, supra note 13, Annex IA [hereinafter Subsidies Agreement], reprinted in LAW
OF THE WTO, supra note 13, at 529.
180. Id. art. 2.1; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D).
181. Stephen J. Powell et al., Current Administration of U.S. Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Laws: Implications for Prospective U.S. -Mexico Free Trade Talks, 11
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 177, 236 (1990).
182. Id.
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based on the red, yellow, and green colors of a traffic light. Thus, under the
new GATT 1994 Subsidies Agreement, subsidies are either "red light,"
"yellow light," or "green light."
Red light subsidies are prohibited and.countervailable. These are export
subsidies, that is, subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, on export perfor-
mance (for example, special domestic freight rates for export shipments); and
import substitution subsidies contingent on the use of local content. 183
Prohibited subsidies are deemed to be specific and countervailable.'
84
Yellow light subsidies are permissible but countervailable. These
subsidies are not prohibited but may be countervailed to offset injury, if they
are specific. They may be found to be specific if they are explicitly limited
by law or regulation to certain enterprises, or if the granting authority, in its
administration of the program, limits access to certain enterprises, or if the
subsidy is, in fact, predominantly used by or disproportionately granted to
certain enterprises. 185 Specificity is one of the most controversial issues in
countervailing duty cases. A grant to a particular company is obviously
specific. But are preferential government prices for timber harvesting rights
a specific benefit? In the case involving lumber imports from Canada,
Commerce found these rights specific to the primary timber processing
industries. 8 6  A Canadian-U.S. binational review panel disagreed in a
controversial decision from which both U.S. panelists dissented. 87  The
decision was allowed to stand by an Extraordinary Challenge Committee.
88
Most subsidies, those that are neither red light nor green light, will be
yellow light and thus subject to dispute. In addition, certain yellow light
subsidies are presumed by the Agreement to cause serious prejudice to the
complaining country and thus may more easily be overturned in a WTO
dispute settlement. These are popularly termed "dark amber" subsidies.
They include: large subsidies, subsidies to cover operating losses by an
industry or by an individual firm if the latter are nonrecurring, and
forgiveness of government-held debt or grants to cover debt payments. 89
Green light subsidies are noncountervailable. In addition to nonspecific
subsidies, the GATT 1994 Subsidies Agreement identifies, for the first time,
183. Subsidies Agreement, supra note 179, arts. 2.3 & 3.
184. Id.
185. Id. art. 5.
186. Final Affinative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber
Products from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,570, 22,610 (1992).
187. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In the Matter
of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, USA-92-1904-01 (Dec. 17, 1993). Part
VI of this article discusses the binational panel review system.
188. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In the Matter
of: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, ECC-94-1904-O1USA (Aug. 3, 1994)
[hereinafter Lumber ECC].
189. Subsidies Agreement, supra note 179, art. 6.
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subsidies that not only are permissible (that is, not prohibited), but also
exempt from countervailing measures. This is by far the most significant
change to the Subsidies Agreement. There are three categories of green light
subsidies. The first category is subsidies for industrial research and
precompetitive development. 90 A second potential green light area is
subsidies for disadvantaged regions. To be noncountervailable, government
assistance to an eligible region must be directed both in law and in practice
toward the development of the region as a whole rather than being provided
in a "specific" manner to enterprises or groups of enterprises within the
region. 9' The third green light category is subsidies for the adaptation of
existing facilities to new environmental regulations. 92 Like the other green
light categories, this is a closely circumscribed exception. For example, only
"one-time non-recurring measures" are eligible for this treatment. 93 Parties
seeking noncountervailable status for a subsidy under this provision also must
show, among other things, that the underlying environmental statute or
regulation results in "greater constraints and financial burdens on the
recipient of the subsidy."'
194
C. Agricultural Subsidies
One of the top Uruguay Round negotiating objectives of the United
States, the nation that has always led the field in its actions to eliminate
government subsidies, was to realize international discipline on the provision
of agricultural subsidies. 95 Indeed, widespread displacement of efficient
U.S. agricultural producers from traditional world markets by overproduction
in countries that relied on subsidies was a major impetus for U.S. pursuit of
a new round of GATT negotiations. 196  That objective was substantially
190. Id. art. 8.2(a); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5B)(B).
191. Subsidies Agreement, supra note 179, art. 8.2(b); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5B)(C).
Pursuant to the Subsidies Agreement, art. 2.2, and 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D)(iv), subsidies
provided by a central government to particular regions are normally specific, and thus
countervailable, regardless of the degree of availability or use within the region. Subsidies
Agreement, supra note 179, art. 2.2; 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D)(iv). The provision for "green
light" treatment of certain subsidies to disadvantaged regions constitutes an exception to this
general rule.
192. Subsidies Agreement, supra note 179, art. 8.2(c); see 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5B)(D).
193. Subsidies Agreement, supra note 179, art. 8.2(c)(i); see 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5B)(D)(i)(I).
194. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5B)(D)(i); Subsidies Agreement, supra note 179, art. 8.2(c).
195. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(7). "The
principal negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to agriculture are to achieve
... more open and fair conditions of trade in agricultural commodities by ... resolving
questions pertaining to export and other trade-distorting subsidies .... "
196. See generally Paul C. Rosenthal & Lynn E. Duffy, Reforming Global Trade in
Agriculture, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 145 (Terence P. Stewart ed.,
1996) [hereinafter THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION].
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realized. In the Agreement on Agriculture, WTO Members distinguished
between subsidies that do not distort trade ("green box" subsidies) and those
that do. Green box subsidies, even though they might meet the basic
definition of the Subsidies Agreement by involving a financial contribution
by a government that is specific to an industry and conveys a benefit, were
shielded from national countervailing duty laws for nine years by the "peace
clause," while other agricultural subsidies that met the Subsidies Agreement's
definition of subsidy remained countervailable. 197  Even as to trade-
distorting subsidies, if a Member meets its commitment to reduce the volume
of agricultural products subsidized and its budgetary outlays on such
products, other countries must show "due restraint" in the initiation of
countervailing duty investigations during this implementation period. 198
With regard to non-green box subsidies that Mexico may provide to its
winter vegetable producers, this latter commitment will be of small comfort,
because the Administration has interpreted its obligation in this respect to be
only to restrain from self-initiating countervailing duty investigations of
products subject to the relevant domestic support measures. 99  Due
restraint would not prevent Commerce from initiating an investigation on the
basis of a proper petition filed on behalf of the domestic U.S. winter
vegetable industry.20°
The domestic support measures and export subsidies, identified in Annex
2 to the Agreement on Agriculture, that are eligible for exemption from
countervailing duty laws must meet an extensive list of qualifying re-
quirements.20' Even so, the kinds of government programs eligible for
green box treatment span a wide range of significant benefits to agricultural
197. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, arts. l(f) & 13, WTO Agreement, supra
note 13, Annex 1A [hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture], reprinted in LAW OF THE WTO,
supra note 13, at 227; see also Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 55, at 67 &
268, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, supra note 55, at 723 & 938. The Statement
constitutes unusually authoritative legislative history, because it not only represents the views
of the Executive Branch, but was explicitly approved by the Congress in the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act. 19 U.S.C. § 3511 (a)(2).
198. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 197, art. 13; Statement of Administrative
Action, supra note 55, at 268, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, supra note 55, at 938.
199. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 55, at 268; reprinted in H.R. Doc No.
103-316, supra note 55, at 938.
200. The same industry support concerns outlined in supra part III.D. 1. for an antidumping
petition would apply, as a result of § 702 of Tariff Act of 1930, to a countervailing dumping
petition. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(c)(1)(A)(ii).
201. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 197, annex 2. The WTO Committee on
Agriculture must be notified that these measures are green box subsidies, they must have
virtually no trade-distortive effects, the programs may not involve transfers of funds from
consumers, they may not have the effect of providing price supports to producers, and they
must meet additional criteria set out in Annex 2 for each type of eligible subsidy program.
Id. arts. 5, 6, 18, & annex 2.
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producers. Annex 2 covers, for example, "general services," which can
include product-specific research, marketing and promotion services, and
infrastructure services such as the building of dams, roads, and ports.
20 2
Even certain direct payments to farmers are exempt, such as amounts for
income safety net and insurance programs, crop insurance and disaster
assistance, farmer and land retirement incentives, compliance with
governmental environmental or conservation requirements, and regional
assistance benefits.2 °3 In forwarding the WTO Agreements for approval by
the U.S. Congress, the Administration noted that several U.S. agricultural
support programs would fall within the green box, including crop disaster
assistance, marketing aid, extension services, and research.2°
Conceivably, Mexican winter vegetable producers could argue that some
Mexican government programs qualify for green box treatment. For
example, FOGAIN is a program that provides long-term loans to companies
in priority industries and targeted regions of Mexico. 5 Would such a loan
to a producer of winter vegetables be exempt from countervailing duties
under the Agreement on Agriculture if the loan were used to build an
irrigation channel?
An interesting issue is raised by the fact that several of the green box
subsidies also speak to purposes that surface as green light subsidies under
the Subsidies Agreement. Subsidies for research, for assistance to disad-
vantaged regions, and for meeting new environmental requirements are
nonactionable if they meet the requirements of the Subsidies Agreement. 20 6
Depending on the circumstances, compliance with the requirements of the
Subsidies Agreement may be less stringent than meeting the criteria in the
Agreement on Agriculture. If the program is one that clearly was intended
by the government for agricultural recipients, may the government
nonetheless seek exemption from countervailing duty laws under the
Subsidies Agreement? Would the converse be true? Neither Agreement
resolves this issue. Under basic rules of construction, the more specific
should take precedence over the general, that is, if a program is meant for
agricultural purposes, its actionability should rely on its meeting the
Agreement on Agriculture standards; if the program is general as to eligible
recipients, the fact that a benefit is provided to an agricultural producer most
202. Id. annex 2, at para. 2.
203. Id. annex 2, at paras. 5-13.
204. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 55, at 61, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No.
103-316, supra note 55, at 717.
205. See, e.g., Certain Textile Mill Products from Mexico: Preliminary Results of Counter-
vailing Duty Administrative Review, 56 Fed. Reg. 37,081-82 (1991) [hereinafter Textile Mill
Products from Mexico].
206. Subsidies Agreement, supra note 179, art. 8.2.
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likely should not permit escape from the Subsidies Agreement test.2 7
Another basis for avoiding countervailing duties that will not escape the
attention of the Mexican producers of winter vegetables is the long-standing
U.S. practice of treating agricultural subsidies as nonspecific. Under the new
subsidies regulations proposed by Commerce, a subsidy will not be regarded
as specific "solely because the subsidy is limited to the agricultural
sector."2 8  As applied, the rule means that Commerce would not find a
program de jure specific solely because the law or regulation in question is
limited on its face to the agricultural sector. In deciding whether the
program is de facto specific, Commerce would examine only producers of
agricultural products. Of course, if a program is not found to be specific to
an industry or group of industries, the program is not countervailable. 209
In an early case, Commerce found that extension services provided by
Israel's Ministry of Agriculture and consisting of assistance in production
economics, water and plant use, and applied research were "available to all
sectors of agriculture and [we]re not directed exclusively to rose growers or
any other sector of agriculture [and thus were] not subsidies within the
meaning of the countervailing duty" law. 210 In 1983, Commerce found that
Mexico provided no countervailable benefits to its asparagus producers,
including capital inputs for the construction of irrigation facilities.2 " The
Department of Commerce noted that "such projects are available for use by
the agricultural sector as a whole . . . [and] are not specifically targeted to
asparagus. 212  Similar treatment under the specificity test is provided to
programs that are limited to small- and medium-sized businesses, that is,
Commerce does not consider such programs to be specific.213 This
additional exception likely would have application to a number of the
producers of Mexican winter vegetables as to programs not otherwise
207. See Rosenthal & Duffy, supra note 196, at 172.
208. Countervailing Duties, 62 Fed. Reg. 8818, 8848 (1996) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.502(a)) (proposed Feb. 26, 1997). This approach was first proposed in 1989.
Countervailing Duties, 54 Fed. Reg. 23,366, 23,368 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R.
§ 355.43(b)(8)) (proposed May 31, 1989).
209. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A).
210. Fresh Cut Roses from Israel: Final Countervailing Duty Determination and
Countervailing Duty Order, 45 Fed. Reg. 58,516, 58,519 (1980).
211. Final Negative Countervailing Determination: Fresh Asparagus from Mexico, 48 Fed.
Reg. 21,618, 21,622 (1983) [hereinafter Fresh Asparagus from Mexico].
212. Id. Commerce later made clear that it considered the agricultural sector in Canada
to be a sector of the economy, and not a specific industry or group of industries, even though
agriculture employs a far smaller percentage of the population in Canada than in Mexico.
Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from
Canada, 52 Fed. Reg. 2134, 2137 (1987). The Cut Flowers from Canada case also extended
the agricultural exception to farm improvement loans and to tax credits for farmers. Id. at
2135-36.
213. Countervailing Duties, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8848.
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exempted from countervailing duty treatment either by U.S. law or the
Subsidies Agreement.
D. Subsidies and Mexican Winter Vegetables
Leaving aside a significant equity infusion on noncommercial terms by
the Mexican government214 into the winter vegetables industry as unlikely,
the only potential subsidy programs found by Commerce in cases conducted
in the 1990s are a number of loan programs and the Program for Temporary
Importation of Products Used in the Production of Exports (PITEX), which
allows duty-free importation of products that will be reexported. PITEX
exempts from duties raw materials, packing materials, fuels and lubricants,
and certain machinery used by companies with proven export records.215
Some of these items could be used by winter vegetable producers, although
one would expect the subsidy amounts to be small, particularly if Mexican
producers purchase them from a NAFTA country. Loan programs present
the best chance to discover countervailable benefits,216 but it is difficult to
speculate whether such loan benefits have been received by Mexican winter
vegetable producers in the absence of any Mexican agricultural cases in
recent years.
We also may draw limited conclusions about the domestic industry's
view of the viability of a countervailing duty petition from the fact that the
Southwest Florida Winter Vegetable Growers Association did not file such
a petition as a companion to its 1980 antidumping petition, even though
Mexico did not become entitled to an injury examination by the ITC until
1985.217 With the massive peso devaluation since that time, the elimination
of a number of subsidy programs found by Commerce in the past to be
countervailable, 218 and the ineligibility of agricultural producers for many
of the remaining programs, 21 9 it is unlikely that the amount of money spent
214. See Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Certain Steel Products
from Mexico, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,352, 37,356 (1993).
215. Textile Mill Products from Mexico, 56 Fed. Reg. at 37,083.
216. See, e.g., Porcelain-on-Steel Cookingware from Mexico: Preliminary Results of
Countervailing Duty Administrative Review, 60 Fed. Reg. 49,565, 49,566 (1995) (involving
Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior, S.N.C. (BANCOMEXT) government program
providing short-term financing for producers engaged in export activities).
217. United States Trade Representative Brock signed the bilateral agreement with Mexico
on April 23, 1985. See Determination Regarding the Application of Certain International
Agreements, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,335 (1985).
218. See, e.g., Fresh Asparagus from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. at 21,619 (verifying that
Mexico has discontinued Certificado de Devolumcion de Impuestos Indirectos (CEDI) tax-
credit certificates for all products).
219. In Fresh Asparagus from Mexico, Commerce confirmed that agricultural producers
are not eligible for the popular Fund for the Promotion of Exports of Mexican Manufactured
Products (FOMEX) loans administered by the Mexican Treasure Department with the Bank
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by the Mexican government on subsidy programs for the agricultural sector
is increasing. The relevance of these considerations is evidenced by the fact
that although Mexico was the subject of more than two dozen countervailing
duty investigations in the early 1980s,22° with the exception of the massive
steel petitions filed in 1992 on imports from most steel-producing
nations, 22 no countervailing duty petition has been filed with respect to a
Mexican product since that country became eligible for the injury test over
a decade ago, and several countervailing duty orders on Mexican imports
have been revoked by Commerce in recent years for lack of interest in
continuing the orders on the part of U.S. producers.222
of Mexico as a trustee that was-established to encourage exports. Also, Commerce determined
that only processed vegetables qualify for the Certificados de Promocion Fiscal (CEPROFI)
tax credits used to promote employment and industrial development. Id. at 21,619-20.
220. See, e.g., Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware from Mexico, the People's Republic of
China, and Taiwan, 50 Fed. Reg. 50,855 (1985); Initiation of a Countervailing Duty
Investigation: Portable Aluminum Ladders and Certain Components of Ladders from Mexico,
50 Fed. Reg. 15,950 (1985); Initiation of a Countervailing Duty Investigation: Converted
Paper-Related School and Office Supplies from Mexico, 49 Fed. Reg. 48,347 (1984); Lime
from Mexico: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 49 Fed. Reg. 15,011 (1984);
Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation: Bricks from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 52,496
(1983); Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation: Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from
Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 49,531 (1983); Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation -
Unprocessed Float Glass from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 47,039 (1983); Initiation of Counter-
vailing Duty Investigation: Portland Hydraulic Cement and Cement Clinker from Mexico, 48
Fed. Reg. 14,019 (1983); Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation: Certain Iron-Metal
Construction Castings from Mexico, 47 Fed. Reg. 44,131 (1982); Initiation of Countervailing
Duty Investigation: Toy Balloons (Including Punchballs) and Playballs from Mexico, 47 Fed.
Reg. 23,798 (1982); Ceramic Tile from Mexico: Initiation of Countervailing Duty
Investigation, 46 Fed. Reg. 53,738 (1981); Leather Wearing Apparel from Mexico: Initiation
of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,743 (1980).
221. See Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations and Postponement of Preliminary
Determinations: Certain Steel Products from Austria, Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, Italy,
Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom, 57 Fed. Reg.
32,970 (1992). As to the determination of whether Mexican imports are injuring the domestic
industry, Mexico's imports were cumulated with those of the other countries, as required by
§ 771(7)(G) of the Tariff Act of 1930. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(G). Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon
Steel Products from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Romania,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, U.S. International Trade Commission Report No.
2664, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-319-322, 334, 336-342, 344, 347-353 (Final) & Inv. Nos. 731-TA-
573-579, 581-592, 594-597, 599-609, and 612-619 (Final), at 24 (Aug. 1993).
222. See Litharge and Red Lead from Mexico: Final Results of Changed Circumstances
Administrative Review and Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,530
(Jan. 21, 1991); Iron-Metal Construction Castings from Mexico: Final Results of Changed
Circumstances Countervailing Duty Administrative Review and Revocation of Countervailing
Duty Order, 55 Fed. Reg. 39,498 (Sep. 27, 1990).
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V. BINATIONAL PANEL REVIEW OF ANTIDUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTY DETERMINATIONS
A. The Agreement
Nine years ago the United States agreed with its neighbor to the north,
and later with its southern border partner, to a unique and still controversial
cession of judicial sovereignty. Chapter 19 of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement, overtaken in 1994 by Chapter 19 of NAFTA when Mexico
joined the pact, provides an innovative solution to a complex issue, that is,
how to satisfy our free-trade agreement colleagues that U.S. unfair trade laws
will be applied fairly to their imports, while preserving the right of U.S.
producers to be protected fully from unfairly traded imports from two of our
most important trading partners.
Chapter 19 provides for the review of antidumping and countervailing
duty determinations involving goods of another NAIFTA party by independent
binational panels composed of private trade law experts chosen by the two
countries involved in the dispute, instead of the traditional review by national
courts. Article 1904 of NAFTA provides that final determinations (as
defined in Article 1911) of the investigating authorities in each country2 23
that involve goods of the other country224 will be subject to review by
binational panels selected by the two governments.225 Panelists cannot be
government employees or otherwise affiliated with the governments (judges
are not considered affiliated with governments for this purpose) and a
majority of the panelists on a given panel (including the chair) must be
lawyers in good standing. All panelists are to be selected on the basis of
223. The U.S. Department of Commerce's International Trade Administration and the U.S.
ITC (to decide injury) in the United States; the Deputy Minister of National Revenue for
Customs and Excise and the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (which decides injury) in
Canada; and the International Trade Practices Division of the Department of Commerce and
Industry (SECOFI), which decides both dumping or subsidization and injury in Mexico.
224.. Whether an investigation involved Mexican goods, for example, would be decided by
the International Trade Administration, applying U.S. antidumping law to the facts of the
specific investigation. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Canada-Mexico, Jan. 1,
1994, art. 1901(1), 32 I.L.M. 289, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 103-159, at 1231-32 (1993)
[hereinafter NAFTA]. This is an exception to the rules of origin provided in Chapter 4 for
other trade matters regulated by NAFTA.
225. A clear distinction should be drawn between the binational panels that will review
antidumping and countervailing duty determinations under Article 1904 and panels that review
statutory amendments to the antidumping and countervailing duty laws to advise on the
consistency of such amendments with GATT or NAFTA. Findings of panels that review
statutory amendments are not binding, although the failure of the governments to resolve the
problem after a panel's finding on inconsistency authorizes the other government to take
equivalent legislative or executive action. Id. art. 1903.
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their "objectivity, reliability, sound judgment, and general familiarity with
international trade law." '226
The emphasis on legal knowledge, even for the nonlawyer panelists, is
well-placed because the panel's function is to determine whether the
investigating authority has properly applied its antidumping or countervailing
duty law, based solely on the record created during the administrative process
and on the standard of review and the general legal principles that would
apply in that country's courts.227 A final determination may be challenged
under normal judicial review procedures only if neither government requests
a panel within thirty days after receiving notice of the determination.228
The government request may be either on its own initiative or at the
insistence of a private party that would otherwise have standing under
domestic law to bring an action in the courts. 2
29
If the panel finds that the investigating authority has incorrectly applied
its antidumping duty law, the panel will remand the determination for action
not inconsistent with the panel's decision and must establish a time limit for
compliance with the remand.23° Under very limited circumstances, the
decision of a panel may be brought before an "extraordinary challenge
committee" composed of judges or former judges for an expedited
decision. 23' Decisions of the panel are binding on the parties insofar as the
particular matter before the panel is concerned, and the Agreement provides
that the governments may not legislate an appeal of a panel decision to the
domestic courts.232
B. Improvements Made by NAFTA to the U.S.-Canada Model
After five years of experience under the U.S.-Canada agreement, the
parties were able to identify modifications to the binational panel system that
would better reflect the intent of the crafters of the system. First, it should
be noted that despite the addition of a third party, the system did not become
one of trinational panels. Only two parties participate in any given review,
precisely the same situation that would prevail in the judicial systems of the
226. Id. annex 1901.2.
227. Id. art. 1904(2)-(3). See id. art. 1911 for definitions of "administrative record,"
"general legal principles," and "standard of review."
228. Id. art. 1904(10)-(12).
229. Id. art. 1904(5), (7).
230. Id. art. 1904(8).
231. Id. art. 1904(13). The basis for the extraordinary challenge procedure is that a panel
member has a serious conflict of interest, that the panel seriously departed from a fundamental
procedural rule, or that the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, and that such action
materially affected the panel's decision and threatens the integrity of the panel process. For
procedures, see id. annex 1904.13.
232. Id. art. 1904(9), (11).
[Vol. I11
TRADE LAWS AND TOMATOES
countries involved. Perhaps a faithful description of the current process is
that it is triangular.
One improvement introduced by NAFTA is a preference for judges,
either sitting or retired, from the federal courts of the three countries. This
change emphasizes that a panel's task is to apply existing law as a court
would, not to create a new body of law. This change also will have the
effect of reducing the potential for a conflict of interest by trade practitioners
who also represent clients in other trade matters pending before the
administering authorities of the countries involved.
In addition, the procedures for challenging a panel decision through an
extraordinary challenge committee have been improved by expressly
requiring these committees to examine the legal and factual conclusions of
the panel, and by tripling the length of time available to the committees to
undertake that examination.
The third change, the corrective mechanism added by Article 1905, is
quite substantial. The parties recognized that some risk attended the melding
of Mexico's civil law system, together with its recently enacted antidumping
and countervailing duty law, with the common law system, and the more
mature antidumping and countervailing duty laws of the other two NAFTA
parties. The principal protection against an adverse clash of systems was to
ensure sufficient change to Mexico's laws that the exporters of all three
countries would be in a roughly equivalent position. Essentially, this
combination of changes 233 shifts Mexico several steps closer to a common
law system for antidumping and countervailing duty.
Article 1905 then provides that if a party's laws prevent a panel from
being established, or have the effect of rendering its decisions nonbinding,
or if these laws fail to provide a meaningful opportunity for judicial review,
and a special committee agrees that one of these situations exists, the
complaining party may suspend operation of the binational panel system, or
suspend equivalent benefits to the other party. This is, of course, a remedy
reminiscent of GATT. Article 1905 goes on to provide that when and if the
problem is eliminated, any suspension of operation of the binational panel
system would be terminated. This snapback provision, while potentially
draconian in its impact, is an effective and fair method for ensuring that
Chapter 19 continues to operate as the Parties anticipated it would.
233. Id. annex 1904.15 (Schedule of Mexico). Through such provisions as disclosure
meetings, notices of intended action by SECOFI, access to proprietary business information
by counsel under a protective order, detailed reasons for SECOFI decisions, and elimination
of the need to seek an administrative appeal before challenging a SECOFI determination
before a binational panel, Mexico's law was assured a solid foundation in transparency and
due process. One can argue that Mexico's system is more advanced in this respect than
Canada's.
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C. Considerations for Mexican Winter Vegetables
Because binational panel review replaces national courts, the primary
differences to the Government of Mexico 234 of pursuing any concerns
through Chapter 19 review will be procedural. Interlocutory review, not
permitted in U.S. courts for antidumping and countervailing duty deter-
minations, 235 also may not be sought before a panel, although Mexico could
send a signal of its dissatisfaction with the direction in which Commerce or
the ITC is heading in their preliminary determinations by notifying the
United States of its intention to request formation of a panel. Nonetheless,
a panel will not be established until the final determination is issued. 36 A
request by Mexico for a panel after affirmative preliminary determinations
by the agencies would be premature, at least in the sense that not only could
one of the final determinations be negative, but also at that point, the issues
maybe significantly different. Even so, early invocation of Chapter 19 could
serve to put the agencies on notice that certain issues will be scrutinized
carefully, although the agencies rarely need such a reminder, given the full
participation of the private parties in their determinations.
The five-member panels are composed of two members chosen by each
of the involved parties, with the fifth to be chosen by agreement (which has
never happened) or "by lot," that is, by tossing a coin to decide which party
will make the choice, and thus have a majority of its appointees on the
panel. 237  After all panelists have passed their conflict-of-interest
examinations, they elect a chair, who must be a lawyer. 38  Once es-
tablished, the panels move swiftly, in recognition of the deadline of 315 days
imposed by NAFTA.2 9 Because panels do not have equity powers, °
234. As with most other international agreements, private citizens of the NAFTA parties
do not have directly enforceable rights under the Agreement. The government of Mexico
must, therefore, trigger initiation of Chapter 19 dispute settlement. In recognition of the rights
of private citizens to take their complaints to the national court system, NAFTA requires
parties to initiate Chapter 19 procedures upon request by an entity that could have sued in the
courts. Id. art. 1904(5).
235. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(1)(D).
236. NAFTA, supra note 224, art. 1901.4.
237. Id. annex 1901.2.2 -.2.3.
238. Id. annexes 1901.2, 1901.6. The principal potential conflicts of the practicing trade
attorneys often chosen are pending cases involving the same companies or issues, or
representation of one of the governments on other legal matters.
239. Id. art. 1904(14). This period does not include the time needed for the agencies to
respond to panel remands. Time also can be added when a panelist realizes midway through
the proceeding that a conflict of interest exists because of one of the issues, and resigns. In
any event, the deadline is unenforceable.
240. United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, Statement of Administrative Action 104,
reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 100-216, at 266 (1988).
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the panel's jurisdiction over the imports at issue is preserved not through a
panel injunction, but by an equivalent order by Commerce to the U.S.
Customs Service.241
As required by NAFTA, panel decisions will be implemented by the
agencies based directly on the panel's order, without need for an intervening
governmental decision, as befits a forum that substitutes for a court. If the
United States believes the panel has seriously exceeded its powers, it may
request reconsideration by an extraordinary challenge committee, an avenue
pursued three times in the eight years of binational panel review, never
successfully.242  The decision to seek such review is made by the U.S.
Trade Representative upon the advice of several interested federal agen-
cies.243 In the view of some trade practitioners, past extraordinary chal-
lenge committees have so limited the availability of this remedy that such a
committee can be expected to act only if a panel overtly refuses to apply the
clearly relevant standard of review, or if it contains a truly corrupt panelist
whose vote mattered.2"
VI. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
A. Early GATT Practice
To understand the present nature of dispute settlement in the WTO, one
needs to have a picture of the winding path GAT has taken to reach this
critical point. In effect, what began as a diplomacy-driven process of
negotiation to resolve disputes has, rather amazingly, and perhaps without a
full appreciation by the parties of its impact, been transformed into a rule of
law.
At their inception, GATT dispute settlement procedures were straightfor-
ward. If a party considered that benefits to which it was entitled under the
Agreement were being nullified or impaired, the Agreement entitled the party
to the "sympathetic consideration" of the party alleged to have violated its
241. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(5)(C). In a limitation that became controversial in the Lumber
Products from Canada case (as did virtually everything else in that proceeding), this
injunction equivalent is not available during review of the original antidumping or
countervailing duty investigation, because actual assessment of duties occurs only during later
proceedings by Commerce under § 751(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930. Id. § 1675(a) (1996);
see Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 240, at 104, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No.
100-216, supra note 240, at 266.
242. See United States - Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In the
Matter of: Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork from Canada, ECC-91-1904-O1USA (June 14, 1991);
United States - Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In the Matter of:
Live Swine from Canada, ECC-93-1904-O1USA (Apr. 8, 1993); Lumber ECC, supra note 188.
243. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C.
§ 3432(c)(2)(B)(iv) (1994).
244. Conversations by author with members of trade bar.
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GATT obligations or otherwise caused the nullification or impairment.245
If these consultations failed to resolve the dispute, the matter could be
referred to the contracting parties (that is, the parties to the Agreement acting
jointly 2 46) for investigation, to be followed by a recommendation or
ruling.247
Over time, these investigations progressed from being handled by a
working party to a panel of experts to a separate panel for each case, none
of which is identified by the Agreement, and each of which is an inexorable
step toward greater objectivity in the dispute resolution process. 248  After
receiving the panel's report, the contracting parties could, if they considered
the situation "serious enough," authorize the complaining party to impose
countermeasures in the form of suspension of GATT concessions,249
although they have done so only once, in a complaint by the Netherlands
involving U.S. quotas on the importation of dairy products.25 ° Modest
procedures for the handling of Article XXIII complaints were adopted in
1966. I
B. Tokyo Round
GAT 1947's very sketchy provisions were fleshed out minimally by a
framework understanding on dispute settlement rules252 and by the par-
ticular provisions of the six new 1979 Tokyo Round codes addressing
nontariff measures (standards, government procurement, subsidies, antidum-
ping, customs valuation, and import licensing). These provisions continued
the emphasis on stimulating settlement by Parties through an informal,
policy-oriented reasoning together approach, although they made an initial
stab at a disciplined process with the setting of loose time limits for panel
245. GATT 1947, supra note 8, art. XXII(1).
246. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, at xxxix (1969).
247. GAIT 1947, supra note 8, art. XXIII(2).
248. Compare Chile's complaint against Australia's fertilizer subsidies, GAIT, B.I.S.D.
at 193 (1952) (working party), with the poultry war between Europe and the United States,
GATT, B.I.S.D. (12th Supp.) at 65 (1964) (expert panel), and European Communities:
Refunds on Exports - Complaint by Brazil, GAIT, B.I.S.D. (27th Supp.) at 69 (1981)
(individual panel).
249. GATT 1947, supra note 8, art. XXIII(2). If the party whose concessions were
withdrawn disapproved of the remedy, its only recourse was to withdraw from the Agreement
within a shorter time period than otherwise provided under Article XXXI.
250. Netherlands Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the United States, GATT,
B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 32 (1953).
251. Procedures Under Article XXIII, GATT B.I.S.D. (14th Supp.) at 18 (1966).
252. Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) 1980, reprinted in THE TEXTS OF THE TOKYO
ROUND AGREEMENTS 200 (GATT 1986). Article 7 of the Understanding explicitly reaffirms
that the customary practice of GATT in the field of dispute settlement includes the 1966
procedures for the settlement of disputes between developed and less-developed countries.
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reports and for compliance with panel recommendations. In hindsight, it is
clear that the sixty-day targets in the codes for completion of panel
proceedings and the "reasonable period" suggested for bringing the offending
laws into compliance, harkened back to the clubby 1950s when GATT was
made up of twenty-three like-minded countries whose representatives had
negotiated the Agreement together.253
As became obvious by the failure of these improvements to ensure
successful resolution of a deluge of disputes, both broader and deeper than
in earlier times, which characterized the 1980s,254 the new GATT had
become an altogether different creature. 255  The basic remedy of GATT
dispute settlement continued to be bringing the offending measure into
compliance with GATT or its agreements. The losing party could continue
to block adoption of a panel report because adoption required the consensus
of the contracting parties. The codes and the understanding confirmed that
countermeasures, in the case of failure of a party to bring its laws into
compliance, could include the withdrawal of GATT concessions, that is,
increased tariffs on products that were not the subject of the dispute. Under
this prescription, countermeasures always, of course, had the effect of
harming or helping industries that had not been injured by the activity that
was the subject of complaint.
Taken together with the fact that the losing party also had the power to
block countermeasures, very few trade disputes were resolved under this
political process, which set the stage for an early harvest in this field during
the Uruguay Round.
C. Mid-Term Uruguay Round Improvements
At the April 1989 mid-term meeting of ministers, the parties agreed to
apply on a trial basis a bold new set of initiatives until the end of the
Round.256 Binding arbitration was added for the first time, as a mutually
agreed upon option (albeit an opportunity that no party chose to take).
Standard terms of reference were adopted when the parties to the dispute
could not agree; failure of the party complained against to agree to the issues
to be decided by the panel had become a standard tactic for delaying the
253. ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE MODERN GAT" LEGAL SYSTEM 29 (1993). Professor Hudec notes that the cohesiveness
of this group was so strong that the first disputes were resolved by a ruling from the chair,
usually accepted by consensus without debate. Id.
254. Amelia Porges, The New Dispute Settlement: From the GATT to the WTO, 8 LEIDEN
J. INT'L L. 115, 117 (1995).
255. See generally HUDEC, supra note 253, ch. 7.
256. Improvement to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Documents, GA!' B.I.S.D.
(36th Supp.) at 61 (1989).
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substantive work of a panel.
Together with this automatic establishment of panels, more realistic
deadlines were established, in recognition of the intense fact-gathering nature
of dispute settlement, as well as the need for considerable legal analysis -
a nine-month deadline was set for the panel's report, with a target of six
months. The GAT' Council was to monitor implementation of an adopted
report, and the subject would, until resolved, remain on the council agenda
beginning six months after adoption. No actual deadline was established for
compliance with a panel's recommendations, although peer pressure had
become decidedly stronger than in earlier days as parties, particularly
developing countries, came to the view that hard-won GATI" benefits were
worth substantially less to them if they could not be enforced. The essence
of the mid-term improvements was that while they clearly were aimed more
toward a judicial rather than a legislative process, any party still could block
adoption of a panel report, and any party still could prevent countermeasures
from being approved even if it permitted the report to be adopted.
D. Dispute Settlement in the Uruguay Round
As might have been predicted from the early harvest, the dispute
settlement procedures that emerged from the Uruguay Round easily were the
most significant advance since GATT was born.257 Parties subjected their
disagreements to truly binding arbitration by the panel process. A panel
report must be adopted unless there is consensus to reject the panel
report.258 Because this consensus must include the winner of the dispute,
this reverse consensus would be exercised only when all agreed to reject an
"outlaw" panel decision, one whose adverse impact on other programs would
be worse than its favorable effects on the activity under dispute.
Tighter timeframes, including for compliance, are provided. "Urgent"
cases (including, for example, those involving perishables), are to be
completed in only three months, while other disputes retain the mid-term
target of six months and deadline of nine.25 9 In a change most resembling
court proceedings, there is an appeal of right to a standing body.26 In the
event of noncompliance, the winning party has the right to retaliate, unless
there is consensus to reject the countermeasures.261
Significantly, the basic remedy is bringing the offending measure into
257. HUDEC, supra note 253, at 194.
258. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art.
16(4), WTO Agreement, supra note 13, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1235 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute
Settlement Understanding].
259. Id. art. 12(8).
260. Id. arts. 16(4), 17.
261. Id. art. 22(6).
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compliance; 262 also unchanged from the original GATT, countermeasures
constitute the withdrawal of GATT concessions.263 In essence, although the
vestiges of a political process remain, the new dispute settlement in the WTO
is mostly a rule-driven, judicially oriented system.
E. Initial Considerations
Under our hypothetical, any petition by the U.S. winter vegetable
industry for the imposition of antidumping264 or countervailing duties
265
would be filed after the January 1, 1995 entry into force of the WTO
Antidumping and Subsidies Agreements. 2 ' Thus, determinations by the
U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. ITC will be subject to binding
WTO dispute settlement procedures. At the outset, one must recall that
GATT disputes are government-to-government affairs; a complaint may be
made only by a government Member of the WTO,267 not by a private
citizen.26s Thus, AGMEX's first task will be to convince its government
that the merits of its concerns with any U.S. action warrant the Mexican
government's putting its own credibility on the line with its trading partners
to bring an action in the WTO. One can surmise that the importance of the
trade in the products in question will weigh in the balance of such a decision.
Special considerations may apply with respect to the timing of Mexico's
complaint, and with respect to the time periods allowed for consultation and
262. Id. art. 22(1).
263. Id. art. 22(3).
264. See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 13, art. 18.3. Unlike the 1979 codes, all
WTO signatories automatically agree to adhere to the terms of all the Uruguay Round
agreements, except for the so-called plurilateral agreements. Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round Multinational Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, para. 4, 33 I.L.M.
1143 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]. Plurilateral agreements concern trade in civil aircraft,
government procurement, the dairy agreement, and the bovine meat agreement. Plurilateral
Trade Agreements, WTO Agreement, supra note 13, Annex 4, reprinted in LAW OF THE
WTO, supra note 13, at 757.
265. Subsidies Agreement, supra note 179, art. 32.3.
266. Final Act, supra note 264, at para. 3. The U.S. law implementing the results of the
Uruguay Round makes the new provisions effective on the date on which the WTO
Agreement enters into force for the United States. Uruguay Round Trade Agreements Act
§ 130, 19 U.S.C. § 3531 note (1996).
267. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 258, art. 1.
268. Both Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411, and the European
Union Trade Barriers Regulation, Council Reg. (EC) No. 3286 (1994), while leaving with
governments the ultimate discretion whether to bring the matter before the WTO, permit
private citizens to engage the resources of their governments in the investigation whether a
practice actionable under the WTO has been taken by another WTO member. The WTO
dispute between the United States and Japan concerning photographic film was begun as a
Section 301 petition filed by Kodak; the EU recently initiated a Trade Barriers Regulation
investigation of the U.S. Antidumping Act of 1916 on the basis of a petition filed by a
European steel trade association, EUROFER.
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for issuance of a panel report. As to the timing of a complaint, disputes
involving antidumping determinations were treated differently than those
concerning countervailing duty measures, at least prior to the Uruguay Round
Agreements. With regard to challenges to antidumping determinations, the
Antidumping Agreement has long required, with minor exception, that the
complainant await "final action ... by the administering authorities of the
importing Member to levy definitive antidumping duties or to accept price
undertakings,, 269 which translates in the U.S. system to the antidumping
order issued by Commerce after affirmative determinations of dumping and
injury have been reached by Commerce and the ITC, respectively.270 Thus,
the Mexican government could not request establishment of a dispute
settlement panel to review an antidumping measure until the completion of
investigations by both agencies, unless it could demonstrate that "provisional
measures" have both had a "significant impact" and suffer from a gross
procedural defect, such as the failure of the agency to make a preliminary
injury finding. 1  Provisional measures are the steps taken by the
authorities after partial investigation to ensure the integrity of any final action
to assess duties and are similar to an injunction issued by a court to protect
its jurisdiction. Such measures usually take the form of a requiring a security
bond to be posted by the importer.2  As to a countervailing duty action,
the Subsidies Agreement imposes no similar limitations on the timing of a
challenge to countervailing duty measures, no doubt in recognition of the fact
that countervailing duty measures scrutinize the behavior of governments, not
private companies. Early challenge, even at the initiation stage, is not
necessarily precluded,273 although the Dispute Settlement Understanding
269. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 13, art. 17.4.
270. In GAIT terms, "levy" means the "final legal assessment or collection of a duty."
Antidumping Agreement, supra note 13, art. 4 n.12. The order issued by Commerce under
§ 736(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 is final action to levy such duties (albeit in the future)
because the order "directs customs officers to assess an antidumping duty" equal to the
dumping margin later calculated by Commerce during its periodic review of imports made
subject to the order. 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a)(1).
271. Article 17.4 refers to the three procedural defects regarding the procedures for
application of provisional measures as contained in Article 7.1. Antidumping Agreement,
supra note 13, arts. 17.4, 7.1, respectively. These procedural defects are (1) improperly
initiating an investigation; (2) issuing a preliminary determination without affirmative findings
both of dumping and injury; or (3) failing to find that provisional measures are needed. While
conceding that these standards provide room for spirited debate, it also is clear that the
drafters intended the exceptions to be limited. See id. art. 7.1.
272. See id. art. 7.2.
273. The Government of Canada challenged, unsuccessfully, self-initiation by the United
States of a countervailing dumping investigation of softwood lumber in United States.
Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from Canada, GATT B.I.S.D. (40th Supp.)
at 35 (1992). As to an antidumping measure, no reading of the Antidumping Agreements
would permit a challenge at the initiation stage of an investigation. Yugoslavia: Status as a
Contracting Party, GAIT B.I.S.D. (40th Supp.) at 35 (1992).
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that emerged from the Uruguay Round probably eliminates that option.274
As to the time periods for resolution of the dispute, the WTO provides
for expedited timelines "[i]n cases of urgency, including those which concern
perishable goods. 275 Parties are admonished to "accelerate [consultations]
to the greatest extent possible, 276 and panels to issue their reports in three
months, half the time otherwise permitted. 7  The Dispute Settlement
Understanding does not specify how one would decide whether a case is
urgent, that is, whether a simple assertion by Mexico would be sufficient,
whether the Parties at issue must agree, or whether the Dispute Settlement
Body itself must decide.278 The fact that winter vegetables are perishable
would not necessarily be dispositive if, for example, the complaint were filed
at the end of a growing season. One thing is clear - a three-month target
for issuance of a panel report will not make the issues easier for a panel to
resolve; such a timeframe may be unrealistic and lead to an ill-considered
analysis.
F Standard of Review
In addition to the procedures common to all of the eighteen WTO
agreements, 279 by far the most significant additional rule that applies to
antidumping and countervailing duty determinations is the special standard
of review. U.S. negotiators recognized that given the tight new rules on
nontariff measures to be established by the WTO agreements and the
continuing desire of U.S. exporters to pry open foreign markets, the United
States could expect often to be the complainants in WTO dispute settlement
and, thus, to be a main beneficiary of more effective dispute resolution. On
the other hand, it also was clear from past complaints that U.S. antidumping
and countervailing duty determinations would often enough be the subject of
complaint by other parties. In light of the quasi-judicial nature of antidum-
ping and countervailing duty determinations under the expansive WTO
Antidumping and Subsidies Agreements, deference to the expertise of the
administering authorities in this technical field seemed appropriate. As a
274. For example, Articles 4(4) and 6(2) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
contemplate that challenges will be brought with respect to "measures." Dispute Agreement
Settlement, supra note 258, arts. 4(4), 6(2). Initiation of an investigation is not a "measure,"
which is a term distinguished from the term "investigation," throughout the Understanding.
275. Id. art. 4(8).
276. Id. art. 4.9.
277. Id. art. 12(9).
278. Because the Dispute Settlement Body must operate by consensus, id. art. 1(4), this
third option adds nothing to the mix because the United States still could disagree on the
urgent nature of the situation.
279. That is, the procedures applicable as a result of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
Id. art. 1 & app. 1.
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result, during the final weeks of the round, U.S. negotiators engaged in a
fierce, solitary campaign to codify this deference in a special standard of
review and identified this critical issue as one of its short list of deal
breakers. 280 Remarkably enough, this crusade succeeded, at least in part.
Article 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement specifies that in its
assessment of the facts of an antidumping dispute, a panel shall determine
whether evaluation of those facts by the administering authorities was
"unbiased and objective." If so, "even though the panel might have reached
a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned., 2 ' As to the
legal conclusions of the administering authorities, if "the Agreement admits
of more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the
authorities' measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon
one of those permissible interpretations. 282  De novo review, then, is
inappropriate, and with respect to the factual findings of the agencies,
substantial deference is required, in that the panel is not permitted to make
an independent decision as to whether the facts are accurate, but is permitted
only to ensure the propriety of the examination of those facts by the
administering authority.
The standard as to legal conclusions is, of course, the Chevron
doctrine. 28 3 Article 17.6(ii) requires the same two-step process as did the
U.S. Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.284 First, the panel is to decide whether the language of the
Agreement explicitly resolves the issue and if not, is to uphold the agency's
legal interpretation if it is one permissible reading of the Agreement. 285 As
the United States put it in its definitive interpretation of the WTO
280. Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review,
and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 194 (1996). Professors
Croley and Jackson find this priority by the U.S. Government "particularly odd," even while
stating, accurately, in later discussion that "the standard-of-review question goes to the core
of an international procedure that (in a rule-based system) must assess a national government's
actions against a treaty or other international norms. Id. at 194, 197.
281. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 13, art. 17.6(i).
282. Id. art. 17.6(ii).
283. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984).
284. Id.
285. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 13, art 17.6(ii); see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
One can envision substantial litigation over whether a provision of the Agreement permits of
more than one interpretation. One example would be if the Agreement is silent on the point
(for example, whether a country can take action to prevent circumvention of an antidumping
or countervailing duty order). In that instance, more than one permissible interpretation is
possible, unless other provisions of the Agreement indirectly preclude the interpretation.
Professors Croley and Jackson suggest that this provision is unclear, based on the interpretive
rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Croley & Jackson, supra note 280,
at 201. But my view is that the dozens of court cases interpreting Chevron will be instructive
to panels in this respect.
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Agreements and their implementing legislation, "Article 17.6 ensures that
panels will not be able to rewrite, under the guise of legal interpretation, the
provisions of the Agreement, many of which were deliberately drafted to
accommodate a variety of methodologies. 28 6 In short, if a provision in
such a carefully drafted Agreement is ambiguous, one can be reasonably sure
the uncertainty was the purposeful resolution of conflicting views.
GATr expert Professor John Jackson has argued that the presence in
administering authorities of "technical superiority over factual matters,"
recognized by the deferential standard of art. 17.6(i), does not justify such
deference for their legal interpretations, because agencies "probably do not
bring ... any specialized understanding that renders them specially qualified
to ascertain the legal meaning of international agreements.28 7  To the
contrary, the comparison of agencies and courts central to the Chevron
analysis rings equally true for agencies and binational panels: ad hoc
panelists confronting a provision of the Agreement for the first and likely
only time can only serendipitously approach the expertise of agencies
obligated to conform their practice to the international rules and who apply
those rules on a daily basis in a variety of actual case situations. Moreover,
it is possible that Professor Jackson, in his commitment to a rule-based
dispute settlement system, overstates the proper role of panels, viewing them
as vindicators of the political decisions made by the parties as a whole.288
In fact, the parties retained that role to themselves in stating unequivocally
that the purpose of dispute settlement is to "achiev[e] a satisfactory
settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations [of
Members], 28 9 and that dispute settlement is "without prejudice to the rights
of Members to seek authoritative interpretation of provisions of a covered
agreement through decisionmaking under the WTO Agreement. ''290 If there
were any doubt about the role the parties intended for panels, it is resolved
by the Dispute Settlement Understanding's proscription that the dispute
settlement process "cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements. '"291
While no similar provision on standard of review appears in the
Subsidies Agreement, the parties issued a Ministerial Declaration at the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round recognizing "the need for consistent
resolution of disputes arising from anti-dumping and countervailing duty
286. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 55, at 148, reprinted in H.R. Doc.
No. 103-316, supra note 55, at 818.
287. Croley & Jackson, supra note 280, at 208.
288. See id. at 209.
289. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 258, art. 3(4).
290. Id. art. 3(9).
291. Id. art. 3(2).
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measures." 292  As interpreted by the Statement of Administrative Action,
this Declaration "provides for the 'consistent resolution' of disputes arising
from the imposition of antidumping and countervailing duty measures
through the application of the Article 17.6 standard of review to both types
of disputes. ' '293 The parties also decided to review the Antidumping
Agreement's standard of review in three years to consider whether it is
capable of general application. 294 The Mexican government could expect,
then, that panels convened under the Antidumping or the Subsidies
Agreements will apply a deferential standard of review to determinations of
Commerce and the ITC.
G. Prospective Relief
In 1991, the panel reviewing Sweden's complaint about U.S. imposition
of antidumping duties on a steel product recommended that the antidumping
order be revoked and all duties paid be refunded.295 Articulating its long-
held position, the United States strongly objected to the nature of the remedy
recommended, noting that in all but one of the 139 other panel reports, the
remedy recommended had been to bring the offending country's laws into
compliance with its international obligations within a reasonable period of
time. The United States contended that it was entirely inappropriate for a
panel to "mandate precisely what a sovereign country must do to comply
with its international obligations," and that if this "radical expansion of
GATT law" were to be accepted, the United States would insist on
retroactive remedies in other areas of dispute settlement, such as Article III
violations, customs tariffs in excess of bound rates, and other situations. 96
In light of this panel report and a similar one issued in 1992 by a panel
reviewing the U.S. antidumping order on Mexican cement,297 the United
292. Declaration on Dispute Settlement Pursuant to the Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 or Part V of the Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Ministerial Decisions and Declarations, Apr. 15,
1994, Decisions and Declarations Relating to the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 [hereinafter Decisions & Declarations:
Article VI GATT 1994], reprinted in LAW OF THE WTO, supra note 13, at 783.
293. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 55, at 148, reprinted in H.R. Doc.
No. 103-316, supra note 55, at 818.
294. Decision on Review of Article 17.6 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Decisions & Declarations: Article
VI GAIT 1994, supra note 292, reprinted in LAW OF THE WTO, supra note 13, at 781.
295. United States - Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Seamless Stainless
Steel Hollow Products from Sweden, GAT Doc. ADP/47 paras. 5.23-.24 (1990).
296. Minutes of the Meeting Held on 19 November 1990, GATT Doc. No. ADP/M/30, at
4-5 & 7-8 (Jan. 10, 1991).
297. United States - Antidumping Duties on Gray Portland Cement and Cement Clinker
from Mexico, GAT Doc. ADP/82 (1992).
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States entered the Uruguay Round Negotiations with the objective of
clarifying the proper function of dispute panels.298 The WTO Agreement
does not explicitly prohibit panels from making specific and retroactive
recommendations, although the parties did emphasize that "the first objective
of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of
the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the
provisions of any of the covered agreements." 299  The United States
nonetheless clearly accomplished its purpose in the implementing legislation,
which provides that where determinations by Commerce or the ITC are
impacted by WTO decisions that the United States chooses to implement,
relief may only be applied on a prospective basis, that is, the agency's
redetermination to bring its antidumping or countervailing duty decision into
compliance with the WTO may only apply to imports made after the U.S.
Trade Representative directs such implementation.
As the Administration explained in its transmittal of the legislation to the
Congress, this approach is consistent with the principle that GATT
recommendations apply prospectively only, and is distinguishable from relief
available in actions brought in courts or before NAFTA panels, where
retroactive relief may in certain circumstances be appropriate. If implemen-
tation of a WTO panel report should require revocation of an antidumping
and countervailing duty order, imports made before the Trade Representative
directed implementation of the report would remain subject to potential duty
liability.301 With regard to a potential WTO complaint regarding any U.S.
antidumping and countervailing duty measure on Mexican winter vegetables,
this means that recourse to the national courts or to a NAFTA panel would,
if successful, have greater potential for immediate practical impact on
AGMEX than resort to a WTO dispute resolution process, in that the United
States has committed to prospective implementation of any adverse panel
report, if it decides to implement the report at all.
VII. CONCLUSION
As noted at the outset, major trade wars will not, even between the
closest of trading partners, yield solely to the fervent wishes of the countries
involved that the matter be put behind them. The parties must eliminate the
298. James R. Cannon, Jr., Dispute Settlement in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Cases, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 196, at 359, 372.
299. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 258, art. 3(7).
300. Uruguay Round Trade Agreements Act § 129(c)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 3538(c)(1).
301. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 55 at 357, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No.
103-316, supra note 55, at 1026.
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causes of the dispute, whether it is unfair pricing, government subsidies,
unjustified phytosanitary requirements, excess capacity, or differing notions
of worker security. Often the unfair trade laws can, because of the
effectiveness of their remedies and the international acceptance of their rules,
serve as unique catalysts to bring the warring parties to that realization. In
my view, that is likely to be the case in the Florida-Mexico tomato conflict,
although the careful reader will not expect overnight success.
